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 Abstract
The	role	of	bargaining	councils,	the	central	pillar	of	collective	bargaining	in	South	Africa,	
in	 the	 formation	of	wages	 is	 important	 in	 the	context	of	high	unemployment	 rates	 in	
South Africa. In this study we find that while institutionalised collective bargaining system 
covered	substantially	more	 formal	sector	workers	 in	2005	(30	percent)	compared	 to	
1995	(15	percent),	this	still	meant	that	less	than	a	third	of	the	formally	employed	were	
covered	by	bargaining	councils.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	overall	 rise	 in	 the	number	
of	workers	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	between	1995	and	2005	was	
driven	almost	primarily	by	 the	 introduction	of	public	sector	councils.	Thus,	bargaining	
council coverage in the first decade of democracy is characterised by an erosion of 
coverage	within	 the	private	sector	bargaining	council	system	on	 the	one	hand	and	
the	rapid	 rise	of	 this	system	of	bargaining	 in	 the	public	sector.	The	descriptive	data	
and multivariate models show therefore a significant wage premium associated with 
coverage under public sector councils in 2005, in excess of the large and significant 
union	wage	premium.	The	decline	in	the	bargaining	council	system	in	the	private	sector	
is	accompanied	by	declining	wage	premia	 for	 formal	sector	workers	covered	under	
private sector bargaining council agreements, with our preferred specification in 2005 
indicating no significant private sector bargaining council wage premium.  The wage 
premium	associated	with	union	membership	however	 remains	very	strong	between	
1995	and	2005.		Furthermore,	not	only	did	union	membership	in	1995	and	2005	award	
wage	premia	across	the	wage	distribution,	 it	also	served	to	reduced	wage	 inequality,	
particularly	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.
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 1. Introduction 
Bargaining	councils	(known	as	industrial	councils	before	1995)	are	the	key	institutions	
involved	 in	 the	statutory	system	of	collective	bargaining	and	wage	determination	 in	
the	South	African	 labour	market.	A	bargaining	council	can	be	established	by	one	or	
more	registered	trade	unions	and	one	or	more	registered	employer	organisations	for	
a specific sector and area. Worker interests are therefore represented at a bargaining 
council	by	 the	party	 trade	unions.	Both	 trade	unions	and	bargaining	councils	have	
claimed to be contributing to labour market inflexibility, and specifically wage inflexibility. 
The	extensions	of	wage	agreements	to	non-bargaining	council	members	and	non-union	
members	are	deemed	to	be	particularly	problematic	and	it	has	been	argued	that	these	
extensions	place	unnecessary	burdens	on	small	and	new	businesses	and	contributes	
to	the	high	unemployment	rate	in	the	country	(see	for	example	Butcher	&	Rouse,	2001:	
349,	350;	Michaud	&	Vencatachellum,	2001:	3).	 	Ultimately,	however,	 the	role	played	
by	bargaining	councils	–	 their	 forerunners	 the	 industrial	councils	and	of	course	trade	
unions,	in	wage	formation	–	is	a	key	component	of	the	broader	ongoing	debate	around	
South	Africa’s	labour	regulatory	environment.
A	number	of	past	studies	have	explored	 the	wage	premium	associated	with	union	
membership	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	Depending	on	 the	data	sets	used,	
dependent	variable	(hourly,	weekly,	monthly	or	annual	wages)	and	 the	methodology	
used,	the	size	of	the	estimated	union	premium	differs	widely.1	These	studies	generally	
found a positive and significant wage premium associated with union membership. 
Not	many	studies	have,	however,	investigated	the	role	of	bargaining	councils	in	setting	
minimum	wages	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	The	only	noteworthy	study	was	
that	conducted	by	Butcher	and	Rouse	in	2001.	Using	data	from	1995,	they	found	that	
African	workers	who	belonged	to	an	industrial	council,	but	not	a	union,	earned	about	10	
percent	more	than	those	workers	not	covered	by	an	industrial	council	agreement.	When	
these	workers	belonged	to	a	union	too,	the	wage	premium	increased	to	more	than	30	
percent.	
The	main	objective	of	this	study	is	to	evaluate	the	role	of	bargaining	councils	 in	wage	
formation in the South African labour market. Specifically, the study aims to determine 
what	premium	is	associated	with	Bargaining	Council	membership	as	distinct	from	Union	
membership,	for	employees	in	the	South	African	labour	market.
	 See	Michaud	and	Vencatachellum	(200:	20)	for	a	comparison	of	some	of	the	reported	wage	premia	in	the	literature.
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Section	2	provides	a	brief	 overview	of	 the	development	of	 institutionalised	wage	
formation	in	the	South	African	labour	market,	focusing	on	the	establishment	of	industrial	
councils,	 the	development	of	a	dual	system	of	 industrial	 relations	 in	 the	country	and	
the	shift	 from	industrial	councils	 to	bargaining	councils	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa.	
In	Section	3	different	forms	of	wage	formation	are	explored.	The	various	data	sources	
used	 in	our	analysis	and	the	estimation	of	 industrial	and	bargaining	council	coverage	
are	discussed	 in	the	Section	4.1,	while	Section	4.2	provides	a	descriptive	overview	of	
the	estimated	coverage	in	terms	of	the	numbers	of	workers	as	well	as	their	associated	
earnings.	Section	5	provides	a	multivariate	analysis	of	earnings,	which	allows	us	 to	
account	 for	 the	simultaneous	 impact	of	a	range	of	 relevant	variables	on	earnings,	 in	
particular,	isolating	the	impact	of	industrial/bargaining	council	and	union	membership	on	
earnings.	Section	6	concludes.
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 2. Institutionalised Wage Formation:  A Brief Overview 
Industrial	councils	were	established	in	response	to	the	need	to	resolve	disputes	such	
as	those	between	mining	companies	and	miners	in	the	early	1920s	as	well	as	the	Rand	
Rebellion	of	 the	1922	when	workers	embarked	on	strike	action	against	employers.	
As such, then, industrial councils represented the first institutionalised representation 
of	collective	bargaining	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	 In	1924,	 the	 Industrial	
Conciliation	Act	was	 introduced	with	 the	specific	aim	of	establishing	a	system	of	
collective	bargaining	(SALDRU,	1990:	3).	The	Act	provided	the	 legislative	 framework	
for	the	establishment	of	industrial	councils	as	well	as	the	framework	for	the	regulation	of	
collective bargaining and industrial conflict. According to Godfrey (1992: 1) the central 
aim	of	 the	Act	was	 to	create	a	system	of	national	 industry-wide	councils	 that	would	
allow	industrial	sectors	to	govern	themselves	by	representative	employer	organisations	
and	trade	unions.	Agricultural	workers,	domestic	workers	and	government	employees,	
however,	fell	outside	the	ambit	of	the	Act	(SALDRU,	1990:	3).
In	practice	an	industrial	council	was	formed	when	an	employer,	employers’	organisation	
or	a	group	of	employers’	organisations	together	with	a	registered	trade	union	group	of	
registered	trade	unions	came	together	and	agreed	on	the	constitution	for	 the	council	
–	and	then	proceeded	to	register	 the	council	 in	 terms	of	 the	Act.	Once	registered,	an	
industrial	council	became	a	permanent	bargaining	 institution	(Godfrey,	1992:	5).	The	
establishment	of	an	 industrial	council	was	voluntary	and	no	provision	was	made	 for	
majority	or	proportional	representation	in	the	legislation,	which	meant	that	councils	could	
accommodate	a	wide	variety	of	 trade	unions	of	varying	sizes	and	 interests	(Godfrey,	
1992:	7).	The	geographical	and	 industrial	scope	 (which	constituted	 the	 jurisdiction	
of	 the	council)	was	also	 left	 for	 the	parties	 to	be	determined.	Finally,	 the	 issues	that	
these	councils	chose	to	negotiate	on,	were	 left	 to	 the	discretion	of	 the	parties	 to	 the	
council, but generally included wages, social welfare benefit funds, and conditions of 
employment	such	as	working	hours.	
The	 Industrial	Conciliation	Act	did	 require	 that	 the	parties	be	 representative	of	 the	
jurisdiction	for	which	the	council	was	seeking	registration.	The	issue	of	representation	
was	 left	 to	 the	discretion	of	 the	Minister	of	Manpower,	but	generally	meant	 that	 the	
parties	represented	 the	majority	of	employers	or	employees	 in	a	geographical	area,	
industry,	occupation	or	trade	(Butcher	&	Rouse,	2001:	351).	Once	an	industrial	council	
was	registered,	 it	could	request	the	Minister	of	Manpower	to	publish	their	agreements	
in	 the	Government	Gazette	 and	 to	 extend	 the	 agreements	 to	 all	 employers	 and	
employees	within	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	council.	The	Minister	could	use	his	discretion	
both	in	the	publication	of	agreements	and	the	extension	of	agreements	and	had	to	be	
DPRU Working Paper 09/135       Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Sumayya Goga
satisfied that the parties to the Industrial Council were sufficiently representative of the 
employers	and	employees	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Council.	For	an	agreement	to	be	
extended to non-parties, the Minister had to be satisfied that non-extension would result 
in	unfair	competition	from	employers	not	subject	 to	the	agreement.	The	publication	of	
an	agreement	 in	the	Government	Gazette	was	legally	binding	and	offenders	could	be	
prosecuted	by	the	state	 in	a	criminal	court.	The	onus,	however,	was	on	an	 industrial	
council	to	enforce	its	agreements.
One	of	 the	most	 important	 features	of	 the	Act,	however,	was	 that	 it	excluded	pass-
bearing	Africans	 from	 the	definition	of	an	 ‘employee’,	meaning	 that	 these	workers	
were	excluded	from	representation	on	 industrial	councils	and	also	excluded	from	the	
agreements	reached	by	industrial	councils.	This	essentially	resulted	in	the	development	
of a dual system of industrial relations defined by race (Godfrey, 1992: 14). 
The	voluntary	nature	of	 the	 industrial	council	system	meant	 that	 industrial	councils	
developed	 in	diverse	and	uneven	ways.	The	envisaged	system	of	national	 industrial	
councils	did	not	materialise	due	to	a	variety	of	factors	such	as	the	exclusion	of	African	
workers,	 low	 levels	of	 trade	union	organisation,	 the	geographic	patterns	of	 industrial	
development	and	deep	racial	and	skills	divisions	between	trade	unions.	As	a	result,	
many	local	and	regional	industrial	councils	developed,	with	a	limited	number	of	national	
councils.	Many	of	the	councils	were	dominated	by	employer	organisations	due	to	weak	
trade	union	organisation,	while	on	the	trade	union	side	representation	was	dominated	
by	artisan	and	pseudo-artisan	unions,	especially	White	craft	unions	(Godfrey	&	Macun,	
1991:	 7).	These	 trade	unions	used	 the	 councils	 for	 the	exclusive	benefit	 of	 their	
members	and	to	the	detriment	of	unorganised	or	poorly	organised	sectors	of	the	labour	
market.	
The	Wage	Act	was	 introduced	 in	1925	as	a	companion	 to	 the	 Industrial	Conciliation	
Act.	The	Act	established	a	Wage	Board	to	make	recommendations	on	minimum	wages	
and	working	conditions.	The	Board	was	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Manpower	for	a	
specific period and undertook investigations and made recommendations to the Minister 
before a wage determination was made for a specific area, sector of categories of 
employees.		The	Minister	was	under	no	obligation	to	make	a	wage	determination	based	
on	the	recommendations	of	 the	Board.	 In	addition,	 the	Board	advised	the	Minister	on	
exemptions	and	extensions	to	a	wage	determination	(Standing	et	al,	1996:	143,144).	
The	Wage	Act	essentially	sought	to	provide	minimum	wages	for	White	workers	that	did	
not	fall	within	the	industrial	council	system	(Republic	of	South	Africa,	1996:	63).	
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Wages	were	also	regulated	 through	so-called	 ‘labour	orders’	which	were	 introduced	
as	an	amendment	to	the	LRA	in	1981.	These	were	designed	to	regulate	wages	mostly	
at	the	bottom	end	of	the	labour	market.	 In	those	industries	that	were	not	governed	by	
industrial	councils,	any	group	of	employers	could	approach	the	Minister	of	Manpower	
with	a	proposal	on	wages	and	other	conditions	of	employment	 for	 the	workers	 they	
employed,	 and	 they	 could	 request	 that	 such	 proposals	 be	made	 binding	 on	 all	
employers	and	employees	 in	the	 industry,	area	or	 trade	concerned.	After	consultation	
with	 the	Wage	Board	and	consideration	of	 representation,	 the	Minister	could	 issue	a	
labour	order	 to	 implement	 the	proposals.	The	order	was	published	 in	a	Government	
Gazette	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 which	wage	 determinations	were	 published	 and	
remained	applicable	until	superceded	by	any	other	wage	regulating	measure	that	was	
determined	to	be	binding	(Standing	et	al,	1996:	144).
In	 the	absence	of	an	 industrial	council	agreement,	a	wage	determination	or	a	 labour	
order,	the	provisions	of	the	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act	(BCEA)	of	1983	applied	
(Standing	et	al,	1996:	133).	Wages	could	be	determined	through	enterprise	or	company	
level bargaining. In non-unionised sectors and firms, however, employment conditions, 
including	wages,	were	often	determined	unilaterally	by	management	and	 took	 the	
form	of	individual	contracts.	In	higher-level	occupations	and	for	higher	skilled	workers,	
employment	conditions	also	 took	 the	 form	of	 individual	contracts	 (RSA,	1996:	54).	
Industrial	Council	agreements	superceded	both	 the	BCEA	and	Wage	Act	 in	 terms	of	
matters	covered	by	the	agreement	(Standing	et	al,	1996:		147).			
Functions	and	Powers	of	the	Industrial	Councils
The	 legislation	only	provided	a	skeletal	 framework	and	 the	details	were	 left	 to	 the	
individual	councils	themselves	to	negotiate	and	agree	upon,	with	the	result	that	councils	
had	different	degrees	of	scope.	Councils	could	negotiate	on	any	matter	of	mutual	
interest	 to	employers	and	employees.	Most	 industrial	councils,	however,	negotiated	
on	matters	 related	 to	wages,	working	conditions	and	benefit	 funds.	A	council	also	
established	procedures	for	dealing	with	disputes	arising	within	its	jurisdiction.
An	equal	number	of	persons	from	the	employer	and	trade	union	organisations	had	to	
be	appointed	 to	 represent	 the	 two	parties	 in	 the	council,	and	 these	representatives	
constituted	 the	bargaining	 forum	that	conducted	 the	actual	negotiations.	The	 forum	
met	periodically	according	to	 its	constitutional	requirements	 to	attend	to	 its	business,	
as	well	as	annually	or	biannually	 to	negotiate	on	 its	main	agreement	(Godfrey,	1992:	
8).	 The	main	 agreement	 of	 an	 industrial	 council	 referred	 to	 the	 agreement	 that	
prescribed	minimum	wage	rates	and	conditions	of	work.	Once	the	main	agreement	was	
published,	 the	 full	agreement	was	generally	never	 renegotiated.	Trade	unions	could	
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submit	proposals	for	amendments	to	the	main	agreement.	Negotiation	would	then	take	
place	between	 the	unions	and	employer	parties.	After	successful	conclusion	of	 the	
negotiations,	 the	new	set	of	agreements	was	presented	to	the	Minister	of	Manpower,	
who	published	a	notice	 renewing	and	amending	 the	main	agreement	 (including	 the	
period	of	 the	renewal).	An	entirely	new	agreement	was	usually	only	published	after	a	
number	or	years	(Godfrey,	1992:	9).
The councils appointed full-time officials to staff the council in order to attend to its day-
to-day	operations.	These	usually	included	a	secretary,	a	number	of	designated	agents,	
and administrative personnel. The majority of the councils were financed by a levy 
(usually	prescribed	in	the	main	agreement)	 imposed	on	all	employers	and	employees	
within	the	council’s	jurisdiction	(Godfrey,	1992:	8).	
Some councils established benefit funds (for example, pension funds and sick pay 
funds) in the main agreement or in separate agreements. Benefit fund agreements 
were	generally	not	renegotiated	very	often	and	remained	in	place	much	longer	than	the	
main	agreement.	Councils	usually	established	sub-committees	to	oversee	the	operation	
of the benefit fund (Godfrey, 1992: 10).
A	sub-committee	within	the	council	was	usually	set	up	to	deal	with	disputes	within	 its	
jurisdiction.	The	 idea	of	self-governance	meant	 that	 it	was	 the	 task	of	 the	council	 to	
maintain	 industrial	peace	within	their	area	of	 jurisdiction	as	well	as	to	provide	a	forum	
through	which	disputes	in	their	area	of	their	jurisdiction	could	be	settled	(Godfrey,	1992:	
7).
The	low	level	of	registered	trade	union	organisation	and	diversity	of	trade	unions	meant	
that	employers	generally	had	the	balance	of	power	in	industrial	councils.	They	dictated	
the	levels	at	which	bargaining	took	place	in	the	councils	and	this,	for	example,	resulted	
in	relatively	low	levels	of	stipulated	wage	minima,	particularly	for	less	skilled	employees	
(Godfrey & Macun, 1991: 7). The fact that pass-bearing Africans were not defined as 
employees	and,	therefore,	not	included	in	the	system	of	industrial	councils,	only	served	
to	reinforce	the	weak	bargaining	power	of	African	employees.	Internalised	management	
of	 industrial	 relations	within	 the	workplace,	 the	 initial	aim	of	 the	 industrial	council	
system,	implied	adequate	representation	for	all	concerned.	However,	unskilled	workers	
were	poorly	represented,	as	the	majority	of	them	were	African.	The	exclusion	of	pass-
bearing	Africans	also	led	to	the	replacement	of	White	workers	by	African	workers	in	the	
semi	and	unskilled	work	categories,	because	they	could	be	paid	 less	 than	the	wage	
prescribed	for	White	workers	in	the	agreement.	In	1930,	however,	the	Act	was	amended	
to	allow	the	Minister	of	Manpower	 to	extend	 the	wage	and	maximum	hours	of	work	
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clauses	to	pass-bearing	African	workers	that	 fell	within	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	relevant	
industrial	council.	African	workers	were,	however,	still	excluded	from	representation	on	
the	councils	(Godfrey,	1992:	17).
Development	of	a	Dual	Industrial	Relations	System
The	Industrial	Conciliations	Act	was	successful	 in	reducing	strike	action	compared	to	
pre-1924	levels	and	 in	boosting	trade	union	as	well	as	 industrial	council	participation.	
It	also	had	some	 less	satisfactory	consequences	and	 these	were	highlighted	by	 the	
Industrial	Legislation	Commission’s	 review	 (the	 first	notable	one)	of	 the	 industrial	
council	system	in	1935	(Godfrey,	1992:	14,	15).	One	of	 the	main	concerns	raised	by	
the	commission	was	the	huge	gap	between	skilled	and	unskilled	wages	in	South	Africa,	
and	the	way	in	which	craft	unions	had	used	the	Industrial	Council	system	to	entrench	
this	gap.	The	commission	also	noted	that	in	many	cases	trade	unions	did	not	negotiate	
for	 less-skilled	workers	and,	 therefore,	 these	workers	were	not	covered	by	 industrial	
council agreements. Another identified failure of the industrial council system was the 
limited	number	of	national	 industry-wide	councils	that	were	created,	which	was	mostly	
the	result	of	the	domination	by	craft	councils	(Godfrey,	1992:	18,	19).	
As a result of the findings of the commission, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
was	repealed	and	replaced	by	the	Industrial	Conciliation	Act	No	36	of	1937.	This	new	
act	sought	 to	 improve	the	protection	of	 the	 interests	of	workers	not	party	 to	 industrial	
councils.	The	act	provided	 for	an	 inspector	 to	attend	 industrial	council	meetings	 to	
represent	the	interests	of	workers	not	represented	by	trade	unions.	It	also	provided	for	
the	extension	of	all	of	the	provisions	of	an	agreement	to	pass-bearing	African	workers,	
and	not	just	those	pertaining	to	working	hours	and	wages	(Godfrey,	1992:	20).	
In	1941,	 the	 formation	of	 the	Congress	of	Non-European	Trade	Unions	 (CNETU)	
constituted	a	milestone,	and	by	1945	there	were	about	158	000	workers	represented	in	
119	unions	(SALDRU,	1990:	3).	Though	these	African	unions	represented	a	substantial	
number	of	people,	they	did	not	fall	within	the	legal	system	and	remained	vulnerable.	In	
1946,	the	state	crushed	a	historic	75	000	strong,	African	migrant	mineworker	strike,	but	
it	was	clear	that	African	workers	were	gaining	organisational	strength.	This	was,	in	turn,	
used	by	the	National	Party	to	fuel	White	fears.	
In	1948,	 the	National	Party	came	 into	power	 in	South	Africa	and	appointed	another	
Industrial	Legislation	Commission	with	 the	 intention	 to	 revise	 industrial	 regulation	
and	bring	 it	 in	 line	with	the	apartheid	policy	(Godfrey,	1992:	20,	21).	The	commission	
found	that	the	wage	gap	between	the	skilled	and	unskilled	workers	persisted	after	the	
introduction of the new Industrial Conciliation Act in 1937 and continued to reflect racial 
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discrimination	(Godfrey,	1992:	21).	 In	addition,	 the	commission	found	that	 inspectors	
representing	African	workers’	 interests	at	 industrial	councils	were	 ineffective	as	 they	
were	not	 familiar	with	 the	needs	of	African	workers	and	 found	 it	difficult	 to	handle	
competing	demands	of	employers	and	employees.	The	commission	called	 for	 the	
establishment	of	a	co-ordinating	body	 to	co-ordinate	wages	and	other	conditions	of	
employment	(Godfrey,	1992:	22).	
The	government	did	not,	however,	adopt	 the	proposal	of	a	co-ordinating	body,	but	
did	make	changes	to	 labour	 legislation	 that	would	 impact	on	the	development	of	 the	
industrial	council	system.	First,	the	Native	Labour	(Settlement	of	Disputes)	Act	of	1953	
excluded	Africans	from	registered	unions	and	prohibited	them	from	taking	part	in	strike	
action.	The	 foundation	 for	a	dual	system	of	 industrial	 relations	was	 laid	with	 the	Act	
providing	for	the	representation	of	African	workers	by	liaison	and	works	committees	to	
negotiate	conditions	of	employment	with	employers	(Van	der	Berg	&	Bhorat,	1999:	7).	In	
addition,	the	pass	laws	were	amended	to	include	African	women,	who	were	now	forced	
to	resign	from	registered	trade	unions	and	were	no	longer	eligible	to	be	represented	on	
industrial	councils	(Godfrey,	1992:	25).	
In	1956	 the	 Industrial	Conciliation	Act	of	1937	was	 repealed	and	 replaced	by	 the	
Industrial	Conciliation	Act,	No.	28	of	1956.	The	key	change	was	the	separation	of	trade	
unions	along	racial	 lines,	meaning	that	White	workers	were	separated	from	Coloured	
and	Asian	workers.	African	workers	were	still	excluded	from	registered	trade	unions.	
If	 the	numbers	by	 race	group	were	 too	small	 to	create	separate	unions,	separate	
branches	by	race	could	be	created	in	the	same	union.	However,	only	White	members	
were	 allowed	 seats	 on	 trade	unions’	 executive	 bodies.	As	 a	 result,	 trade	unions	
became	weaker	as	they	now	competed	against	each	other	at	negotiations	rather	than	
collectively	negotiating	with	employers	(Godfrey,	1992:	25).
Massive	strikes	by	African	workers	occurred	in	1973	and	signalled	the	failure	of	the	dual	
industrial	 relations	system.	 In	response	to	 this,	 the	government	amended	the	Native	
Labour	(Settlement	of	Disputes)	Act	to	restrict	African	trade	union	organisation	and	the	
name	of	the	act	was	changed	to	the	Black	Labour	Relations	Act	of	1973	(Godfrey,	1992:	
26).	Government’s	measures	proved	 inadequate	and	the	system	of	 liaison	and	work-
committees	was	rejected	by	 the	majority	of	African	workers	 in	 favour	of	 independent	
trade	unions.	
In	 the	seventies,	 the	power	of	African	workers	grew	considerably	and	by	1979	there	
were	34	unregistered	African	unions.	As	 these	unions	were	not	 recognised	 legally,	
their	activities	increasingly	emphasised	the	shortcomings	of	the	existing	dual	system	of	
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labour	regulations	as	in	some	instances	the	industrial	regulations	were	being	bypassed	
as	employers	recognised	and	bargained	with	African	unions	(SALDRU,	1990:	5).
In	1977,	 the	Wiehahn	Commission	of	 Inquiry	 into	Labour	Legislation	was	appointed.	
They	recommended	 that	African	workers	be	allowed	 to	 join	 registered	 trade	unions,	
while	unions	should	be	allowed	to	admit	members	from	any	race	group.	This	 implied	
that	African	workers	would	be	allowed	direct	 representation	on	 industrial	councils.	 In	
1979	the	government	adopted	the	recommendation	of	 the	Wiehahn	Commission	and	
amended the Industrial Conciliation Act to change the definition of an “employee” to 
include	African	workers	with	permanent	urban	 residency.	Following	much	criticism,	
the	Act	was	amended	a	second	 time	 in	1979	 to	 include	African	contract	workers	
and commuters in the definition. Participation in an industrial council was, however, 
conditional	on	 trade	union	registration	 in	 terms	of	 the	Act.	African	trade	unions	were	
reluctant	 to	 register	 and	 increasingly	 pursued	 plant-level	 bargaining	 outside	 the	
industrial	council	system	(Godfrey,	1992:	27).
In	1981	the	Industrial	Conciliation	Act	was	once	again	amended	and	the	administrative	
controls	 imposed	on	 registered	 trade	unions	were	extended	 to	unregistered	 trade	
unions,	including	African	trade	unions.		The	amendment	also	repealed	the	Black	Labour	
Relations	Regulation	Act	and	effectively	ended	the	dual	system	of	 industrial	relations.	
In	addition,	this	amendment	changed	the	name	of	the	Industrial	Conciliation	Act	to	the	
Labour	Relations	Act	(LRA)2	(Godfrey,	1992:	27).	
The	unregistered	trade	unions	remained	reluctant	to	participate	in	the	industrial	council	
system	and	perceived	plant-level	bargaining	as	best	suited	 to	 their	own	structural	
requirements	and	democratic	goals	as	well	as	 the	best	way	 to	bargain.	 In	addition,	
these	unions	felt	that	the	industrial	council	system	was	best	suited	to	the	needs	of	craft	
unions	and	unions	that	represented	racial	minorities.	The	need	for	national,	regional	or	
industry-wide	agreements	was	acknowledged	to	provide	for	unorganised	workers,	but	
as	complementary	to	plant-level	bargaining	(Godfrey,	1992:	28,	29).	
During	the	1980s	the	African	trade	union	movement	grew	and	with	this	came	greater	
support	 for	participation	 in	central	bargaining.	 In	1982	at	 the	Second	Congress	of	
African	unions,	some	of	the	larger	unions	called	for	greater	participation	in	centralised	
bargaining,	 claiming	 that	 it	 would	 be	more	 effective	 than	 plant-level	 bargaining.	
The	Federation	of	South	African	Trade	Unions	 (FOSATU),	 the	 largest	 federation	of	
independent	 trade	unions	at	 the	 time,	agreed	 to	participate	 in	 the	 industrial	council	
2	 		 Now	referred	to	as	the	Labour	Relations	Act	(LRA)	of	956.
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system	on	 the	 condition	 that	workers	 could	 join	 a	 union	of	 their	 choice	and	 that	
bargaining	at	industrial	council	level	would	not	preclude	plant-level	bargaining	(Butcher	
&	Rouse,	2001:	352).
The	rapid	growth	of	 trade	unions	placed	a	strain	on	 the	organisational	and	human	
resources	of	 these	unions	and	created	pressure	on	unions	 to	centralise	bargaining	
arrangements.	 Industrial	councils	provided	a	forum	through	which	this	could	be	done.	
The Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), an affiliate of FOSATU, was the first to 
apply	for	permission	to	join	an	industrial	council	and	subsequently	joined	the	Iron,	Steel,	
Engineering	and	Metallurgical	Industry	industrial	Council	(SALDRU,	1990:	7).
The	formation	of	the	Congress	of	South	African	Trade	Unions	(COSATU)	in	1985	led	to	
a series of mergers as affiliates sought to comply with COSATU’s policy of one union in 
one	industry.	However,	the	established	industrial	councils	were	not	adequately	prepared	
to deal with the interests of these unions, which conflicted sharply with their own. The 
unions’	attempts	 to	gain	membership	 to	councils	and	restructure	 the	councils	 to	suit	
their	own	needs	led	rising	instability	within	the	industrial	council	system	(Godfrey,	1992:	
31).
In	addition,	plant-level	bargaining	had	seen	progressive	 trade	unions	securing	wage	
increases	 far	 in	excess	of	 the	minimum	 levels	set	at	 industrial	councils.	While	 the	
unions	participated	 in	 the	 industrial	council	system,	many	continued	to	pursue	plant-
level	bargaining.	The	essence	of	 the	 industrial	council	system	was	to	bargain	at	one	
level	only	and	many	of	the	employer	parties	to	the	councils	were	opposed	to	continuing	
or	entering	 into	dual	 level	bargaining	 to	accommodate	 the	emerging	 trade	unions,	
contributing	to	further	instability	within	the	system	(Godfrey,	1992:	31).
As	noted	above,	there	were	other	avenues	of	wage	determination,	including	the	Wage	
Board.	The	Wage	Board,	however,	became	less	active	in	the	years	leading	up	to	1994.	
Its	coverage	had	declined	and	its	determinations	were	not	updated	regularly.	It	was	also	
found	that	the	determinations	were	rarely	enforced	(RSA,	1996:	63).
 2.1 Bargaining Councils in the Labour Relations Environment since 1994
The	 incoherent	and	 inconsistent,	and	 in	many	cases,	still	 racist,	system	of	 industrial	
relations	which	characterised	 the	pre-1994	era	was	clearly	 in	need	of	 significant	
overhaul	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 democratic	 rule.	 Within	 the	 labour	 market	 policy	
environment,	 the	 immediate	period	 following	the	election	of	 the	majority	government	
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was	characterised	by	a	 frantic	process	of	 recasting	 the	country’s	 labour	 regulatory	
environment.	The	outcome	of	 these	negotiations	between	employers	and	employees	
and the significant rewriting of laws was manifest in four key pieces of legislation. These 
were	the	Labour	Relations	Act	(LRA)	of	1995,	the	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act	
(BCEA)	of	1997,	the	Employment	Equity	Act	(EEA)	of	1998	and	the	Skills	Development	
Act	(SDA)	of	1999.	The	LRA	and	BCEA	were	amended	in	2002,	while	the	Employment	
Equity	Act	was	amended	in	2006.	
The	LRA	and	 the	BCEA	are	 the	 two	key	pieces	of	 regulation	governing	bargaining	
councils	and	wage	determination	and	are	therefore	discussed	in	more	detail	here.
Bargaining	Councils	and	the	Legislative	Environment
The purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objectives of 
the Act” (RSA, 1995: 8). The LRA regulates the organisational rights for trade unions, 
entrenches	 the	 right	 to	strike,	 regulates	collective	bargaining,	as	well	as	 regulates	
dispute	resolution	and	dismissal	procedures	(Bhorat	et	al.	2002:	43)
The	 LRA	 provides	 the	 legislative	 framework	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 bargaining	
councils.	 In	 terms	of	 the	 legislation,	one	or	more	registered	trade	unions	and	one	or	
more	 registered	employers’	organisations	may	establish	a	bargaining	council	 for	a	
sector	and	area.	The	Act	also	provides	 for	 the	State	 to	be	a	party	 to	any	bargaining	
council	 if	 it	 is	an	employer	 in	 the	sector	and	area	 in	which	 the	bargaining	council	 is	
established	(RSA,	1995:	22).	
Section	29	of	 the	LRA	regulates	 the	process	and	 requirements	 for	 the	 registration	
of	a	bargaining	council	 (RSA,	1995:	22-24).	 In	 terms	of	 this	section,	parties	wishing	
to	establish	a	bargaining	council	have	to	apply	 to	 the	registrar	of	 labour	relations	for	
registration	of	 the	bargaining	council.	After	 receiving	 the	application	 the	 registrar	 is	
required	to	publish	a	notice	in	the	Government	Gazette,	allowing	the	general	public	the	
opportunity	 to	object	 to	the	application.	The	LRA	sets	out	 the	steps	to	be	followed	by	
the	person	who	objects	as	well	as	the	applicant.	The	registrar	is	also	required	to	send	
a	copy	of	 the	notice	to	the	National	Economic	and	Development	Council	 (NEDLAC).3	
It	 is	NEDLAC’s	responsibility	 to	evaluate	 the	appropriateness	of	 the	sector	and	area	
	 Nedlac	was	launched	in	995	as	a	forum	where	Government,	organised	business,	organised	labour	and	organised	
community	groupings	meet	on	a	national	level	to	discuss	and	reach	consensus	on	issues	of	social	and	economic	policy	
(see	www.nedlac.org.za).	
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in	respect	of	which	the	bargaining	council	is	proposed	and	provide	the	registrar	with	a	
written	report.	If	NEDLAC	cannot	make	a	decision	on	the	demarcation,	the	Minister	of	
Labour	has	to	advise	the	registrar.	When	considering	the	application	the	registrar	has	to	
determine,	amongst	other	things,	whether	the	constitution	of	 the	proposed	bargaining	
council	complies	with	the	requirements	set	out	in	Section	30	of	the	LRA;	if	it	has	made	
adequate	provision	 for	 the	 representation	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	on	 the	
council; and if the parties to the council are sufficiently representative of the sector and 
area as determined by NEDLAC or the Minister of Labour. If the registrar is satisfied 
that	 the	applicant	meets	all	 the	requirements	for	registration,	the	bargaining	council	 is	
registered	by	entering	the	council’s	name	in	the	register	of	councils.	If	the	requirements	
are	not	met,	the	applicant	is	allowed	30	days	to	comply	with	the	requirements.	
Section	30	(RSA,	1995:	24,	25)	of	 the	LRA,	 lists	 the	requirements	applicable	 to	 the	
constitution	of	a	bargaining	council.	It	covers	representation	(half	of	the	representatives	
must	be	appointed	by	party	trade	unions,	while	the	other	half	must	be	appointed	by	the	
party	employers’	organisations),	processes	of	meetings	and	procedures	 for	decision	
making,	as	well	as	 the	procedures	 to	be	 followed	 if	disputes	arise.	 In	addition,	 this	
section	prescribes	that	the	constitution	should	include	the	procedure	for	exemption	from	
collective	agreements.	Section	31	(RSA,	1995:	25,	26)	explains	the	binding	nature	of	
collective	agreements	concluded	 in	a	bargaining	council,	with	regard	to	the	parties	of	
the	agreement.	
Section	32	 (RSA,	1995:	26,	27)	 regulates	 the	extension	of	collective	agreements	
concluded	in	a	bargaining	council.	In	terms	of	the	LRA,	a	bargaining	council	can	request	
the	Minister	of	Labour	in	writing	to	extend	a	collective	agreement	to	non-parties	which	
fall within its jurisdiction. A number of provisions (See Section 32) have to be satisfied in 
order	for	the	Minister	to	agree	to	extend	a	collective	agreement.	This	includes	that	the	
trade	unions	whose	members	constitute	the	majority	of	the	members	of	the	party	trade	
unions	and	the	party	employee	organisations	that	employ	the	majority	of	workers	must	
vote in favour of the extension. If the Minister is satisfied that all requirements have 
been	met,	 the	collective	agreement	 is	extended	by	publishing	 it	 in	 the	Government	
Gazette.	
Section	33	makes	provision	for	 the	appointment	and	powers	of	designated	agents	of	
bargaining	councils,	who	can	promote,	monitor	and	enforce	compliance	with	any	of	the	
council’s	collective	agreements.	Section	33A	regulates	 the	enforcement	of	collective	
agreements	by	bargaining	councils,	while	Section	34	provides	for	the	amalgamation	of	
bargaining	councils	(RSA,	1995:		27-29).
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Part D of the LRA (RSA, 1995: 29-30) specifically provides for the establishment of 
bargaining	councils	 in	 the	public	service.	The	Act	prescribes	the	establishment	of	 the	
Public	Service	Co-ordinating	Bargaining	Council	 for	 the	public	service	as	a	whole.	
Section	37	gives	the	Public	Service	Co-ordinating	Bargaining	Council	 the	authority	 to	
designate	a	particular	sector	of	the	public	service	for	the	establishment	of	a	bargaining	
council	or	to	change	the	designation	of,	amalgamate	or	dissolve	existing	public	sector	
bargaining	 councils.	 Section	 38	 provides	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 between	
bargaining	councils	in	the	public	sector.
The	second	important	piece	of	 legislation	 in	terms	of	bargaining	councils	 is	 the	Basic	
Conditions	 of	Employment	Act	 (BCEA)	 of	 1997.	The	BCEA	and	 its	 amendments	
establish,	enforce	and	regulate	the	basic	conditions	of	employment.	This	 includes	the	
regulation	of	working	time	and	hours	of	work	(including	overtime),	different	categories	
of	 leave	(annual,	sick	and	maternity),	particulars	of	employment	and	remuneration,	
termination	of	employment;	prohibition	of	employment	of	children	and	 forced	 labour	
(RSA,	1997).
Chapter	7	of	 the	BCEA	regulates	the	variation	of	 the	basic	conditions	of	employment.	
Section 49 of Chapter 7 specifically allows for a collective agreement that has been 
negotiated	 in	a	bargaining	council	 to	alter,	 replace	or	exclude	any	basic	condition	of	
employment	if	the	collective	agreement	is	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	the	BCEA	and	
does	not	 infringe	on	employees’	entitlement	and	rights	as	set	out	 in	 the	BCEA	(RSA,	
1997: 21). It is in this sense, therefore, that the BCEA sets the minimum floor of rights 
for	all	employed	individuals	in	the	South	African	labour	market.	
Chapter	 9	of	 the	BCEA	makes	provision	of	 the	establishment	of	 an	Employment	
Conditions	Commission	(ECC).	The	functions	of	the	ECC	include	advising	the	Minister	
of	Labour	on	the	appropriate	 level	 for	minimum	wages	set	by	sectoral	determinations	
as	well	as	on	trends	 in	collective	bargaining	and	whether	these	trends	undermine	the	
purpose	of	 the	BCEA	(Bhorat,	et	al,	2002:	48;	RSA,	1997:	25).	The	ECC	is	 the	post-
apartheid	successor	to	the	Wage	Board.	While	we	turn	to	this	in	greater	detail	in	Box	1,	
the	ECC	serves	as	a	regulator	of	last	resort.	In	the	event,	therefore,	that	no	bargaining	
councils	exist	and/or	no	representative	trade	union	is	present	in	a	sector,	the	ECC	has	
a	regulatory	function.

Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The Role of Bargaining Councils
 Box 1: Functions and Powers of Bargaining Covariates  
•	 To	conclude	and	enforce	collective	agreements	
•	 To	prevent	and	resolve	labour	disputes
•	 To	perform	certain	dispute	resolution	functions
•	 To	establish	and	administer	a	fund	to	be	used	for	dispute	resolution
•	 To	promote	and	establish	education	and	training	schemes
•	 To	establish	and	administer	pension,	provident,	medical	aid,	sick	pay,	holiday,	
unemployment	and	training	schemes	or	funds	or	any	similar	schemes	or	funds	
for the benefit of one or more of the parties to the bargaining council or their 
members
•	 To	develop	proposals	for	submission	to	NEDLAC	or	any	other	appropriate	forum	
on	policy	and	legislation	that	may	affect	the	sector	and	area	of	jurisdiction	of	the	
bargaining	council
•	 To	determine	by	collective	agreement	the	matters	which	may	not	be	an	issue	in	
dispute	for	the	purposes	of	a	strike	or	a	lock-out	at	the	workplace
•	 To	confer	on	workplace	forums	additional	matters	for	consultation
•	 To	provide	industrial	support	services	within	the	sector
•	 To	extend	the	services	and	functions	of	the	bargaining	council	to	workers	in	the	
informal	sector	and	home	workers
		Source:		RSA,	1995:	22,	23
Bargaining	Councils	in	Practice
All the existing industrial councils established under the “old” LRA were deemed to be 
bargaining	councils	under	the	new	LRA	(Bhorat	et	al,	2002:	48).	Currently,	bargaining	
councils	 range	 from	very	 large	national	councils	 to	small	 regional	or	 local	councils	
(see	Godfrey	et	al,	2006:	6).	Bargaining	councils	potentially	cover	employees	 in	 the	

DPRU Working Paper 09/135       Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Sumayya Goga
private sector who are classified as semi-skilled or unskilled and working for employees. 
This means that when we look at the classifications in the Labour Force Survey, the 
occupation	categories	 four	 to	nine	are	 included	 (Godfrey	et	al.,	2006).	Managers,	
Professionals	and	Technicians	and	Associate	Professionals	are	generally	excluded	
from	bargaining	council	membership.	These	exclusions	are	not	prescribed	by	 law,	
but	rather	a	historical	artefact.	This,	however,	only	applies	to	the	private	sector.	In	the	
public	sector,	 the	situation	 is	different,	with	Professionals	and	even	certain	 levels	of	
management	covered	by	the	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	
As	noted	above,	 the	LRA	(1995)	called	for	 the	establishment	of	a	bargaining	council	
for	 the	public	services	as	a	whole,	called	the	Public	Service	Co-ordinating	Bargaining	
Council	(PSCBC).	The	LRA	gave	the	PSCBC	the	authority	to	designate	a	sector	of	the	
public	service	for	the	establishment	of	a	sectoral	bargaining	council.
Before	1994,	 remuneration	 in	 the	public	sector	was	set	by	a	commission.	No	formal	
negotiations	took	place,	but	staff	associations	representing	White	workers	in	the	public	
service	were	consulted.	Unions	 representing	African	workers	were	excluded	 from	
consultation	(Hassan,	2003).	
In	1997,	 the	constitution	of	 the	PSCBC	was	registered.	 In	 line	with	provisions	 in	 the	
LRS,	 the	PSCBC	designated	 four	sectors	 for	 the	establishment	of	sectoral	public	
service	bargaining	councils	 (PSCBC,	2005).	The	councils	and	 their	scope	are	 the	
following	(note	that	in	all	cases	the	employer	is	the	State):
•	 Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC): “educators” employed in the 
national	and	provincial	departments	of	education
•	 Public	Health	and	Welfare	Sectoral	Bargaining	Council	 (PHWSBC):	employees	
in	national	and	provincial	departments	of	health	and	social	development	as	well	
as	health	professionals	in	other	departments.
•	 Safety	and	Security	Sectoral	Bargaining	Council	 (SSSBC):	 	employees	 in	 the	
South	African	Police	Service	and	the	national	department	of	safety	and	security.
•	 General	Public	Service	Sectoral	Bargaining	Council	(GPSSBC):		all	national	and	
provincial	public	service	employees	that	falls	within	the	scope	of	the	PSCBC,	but	
outside	the	scope	of	the	other	three	sectoral	councils.

Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The Role of Bargaining Councils
As the name suggests, the PSCBC fulfils a co-ordinating function. It is also responsible 
for	overall	policy	 formation	on	dispute	resolution.	 Importantly,	wages	are	negotiated	
in	 the	PSCBC.	A	collective	agreement	signed	 in	 the	PSCBC	is	automatically	binding	
on	sectoral	councils,	unless	a	sectoral	council	has	an	agreement	 in	place	on	 the	
same	 issue	(PSCBC,	2005).	Only	senior	managers	 fall	outside	 the	scope	of	public	
sector	bargaining	councils.	Certain	levels	of	management	and	all	professional	staff	are	
therefore	covered	by	collective	bargaining	in	the	public	sector	(Personal	communication	
with	Hassan,	2007).	As	we	note	 in	greater,	nuanced	and	analytical	detail	below,	 the	
PSBC	remains	central	 to	 the	understanding	of	 the	determinants	of	wages	and	wage	
formation	in	the	post-apartheid South Africa labour market.
One	addition	to	the	above	public	sector	bargaining	councils	is	that	of	local	government	
employees.	The	 local	 government	 sector	 falls	under	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	South	
African	Local	Government	Bargaining	Council	 (SALGBC).	The	Interim	SALGBC	was	
established	in	1997,	followed	by	the	registration	of	the	SALGBC	in	2001	(see	SALGBC	
website).	 Its	powers	and	 functions	 include	 the	negotiation	of	minimum	wages	and	
conditions	of	employment	 in	the	 local	government	sector.	Again,	professional	staff	are	
included	 in	 the	collective	agreements,	with	only	Municipal	Managers	and	managers	
reporting	to	those	Municipal	Managers	excluded	from	the	bargaining	council	(SALGBC,	
2003:	3).

DPRU Working Paper 09/135       Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Sumayya Goga
 3. The Nature of Wage Formation in the South African   
 Labour Market
In	addition	to	bargaining	councils,	wages	can	also	be	set	or	negotiated	in	a	number	of	
other	ways,	either	as	part	of	the	statutory	system	of	wage	determination	or	outside	the	
statutory	system.	This	section	sheds	more	light	on	the	other	avenues	of	wage	formation	
in	the	South	African	labour	market.	
Sectoral	Determinations
Along	with	bargaining	councils,	sectoral	determinations	fall	under	the	statutory	system	
of	collective	bargaining	and	wage	determination.	The	Minister	of	Labour	can	make	a	
sectoral	determination	that	establishes	basic	conditions	of	employment	for	employees	in	
a specific sector and area. A sectoral determination has to be made in accordance with 
the	provisions	in	Chapter	8	of	the	BCEA	and	by	publishing	a	notice	in	the	Government	
Gazette	(RSA,	1997:	23).	A	sectoral	determination	arises	 in	essence	out	of	a	process	
of	 research	and	consultation	between	the	relevant	employers	and	employees	 in	 the	
sector, Department of Labour (DoL) officials and the advisory board, the ECC, reporting 
to	the	Minister	of	Labour.	
A	sectoral	determination,	as	noted	above,	may	set	minimum	terms	and	conditions	
of	employment,	 including	minimum	wages.	 It	may	also	provide	 for	 the	adjustment	
of	minimum	wages,	 regulate	 the	manner,	 timing	and	other	conditions	of	payment	of	
remuneration	as	well	as	prohibit	or	 regulate	payment	of	 remuneration	 in	kind	(RSA,	
1997:	25).	The	Minister	of	Labour	may	not	publish	a	sectoral	determination	covering	
employees	 and	 employers	 who	 are	 already	 covered	 by	 a	 collective	 agreement	
concluded	at	a	bargaining	council.	 If	a	collective	agreement	 is	concluded	 in	an	area	
covered	by	a	sectoral	determination,	the	provisions	of	the	sectoral	determination	will	no	
longer	be	applicable	to	the	parties	covered	by	the	bargaining	council	agreement	(RSA,	
1997:	25).
Currently	(September	2007)	the	following	areas	of	economic	activity	(not	easily	reduced	
to	formal	sectors	and	sub-sectors)	have	sectoral	determinations	in	place	(DoL,	2007):
•	 Forestry		
•	 Agriculture	
•	 Contract	Cleaning		
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•	 Children	 in	 the	Performance	 of	Advertising,	Artistic	 and	Cultural	Activities	
(applicable	to	children	under	15	years).
•	 Taxi	Operators
•	 Civil	Engineering	
•	 Learnerships
•	 Private	Security	
•	 Domestic	Workers
•	 Wholesale	and	Retail	
•	 Hospitality	
These SD’s are regularly updated for inflation through a formal gazetting process.
Non-Statutory	Collective	Bargaining	and	Wage	Determination
Outside	the	statutory	system	of	wage	determination,	collective	bargaining	takes	place	
in	non-statutory	centralised	bargaining	 fora	as	well	as	at	a	company	and	plant-level	
(Godfrey,	2007:	3).
Currently,	 centralised	non-statutory	bargaining	 takes	place	 in	mining,	automobile	
manufacturing	 and	 the	 pelagic	 fishing	 sector.4	 	 In	 the	mining	 sector,	 centralised	
bargaining	 takes	place	only	 in	 the	gold	mining	and	 the	coal	mining	 industries.	The	
Chamber	of	Mines	is	the	employers’	organisation	which	bargains	on	behalf	of	 its	gold	
and	coal	mining	members	with	the	relevant	unions,	dominated	by	the	National	Union	of	
Mineworkers	(NUM).	 It	has	been	estimated	that	 the	centralised	bargaining	agreement	
covered	about	69	percent	of	employees	in	the	gold	mining	industry	in	2002.	Coverage	
in	 the	coal	mining	 industry	 is	much	 lower,	estimated	at	about	36	percent	 in	2002.	
Most	of	 the	members	of	 the	Chamber	of	Mines	 in	 these	 two	 industries	are	covered	
by	 the	collective	agreements.	Gold	and	coal	mines	which	are	not	members	of	 the	
Chamber are covered by firm-level or mine-level collective bargaining agreements (See 
Godfrey,	2007	for	more	detail).	For	example,	while	the	majority	of	platinum	producers	
are members of the Chamber, the industry is mostly covered by company specific 
agreements.	The	main	employers	 in	 the	diamond	mining	 industry	are	also	Chamber	
	 This	section	on	non-statutory	centralised	bargaining	draws	on	Godfrey,	2007
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members,	but	again	 they	are	party	 to	company-specific	agreements	 (Chamber	of	
Mines,	2007).
The	National	Bargaining	Forum	(NBF)	for	 the	automobile	 industry	was	established	 in	
1990.	The	parties	to	the	NBF	are	the	National	Union	of	Metal	Workers	of	South	Africa	
(NUMSA)	and	the	seven	Original	Equipment	Manufacturers	 in	 the	country.5	The	NBF	
produces	three-year	agreements,	with	the	main	focus	on	setting	wages	and	conditions	
of	employment.	
In	 the	 centralised	bargaining	 forum	 for	 the	pelagic	 fishing	 sector,	 employers	 are	
represented	by	the	South	African	Pelagic	Fish	Processors	Association	and	employees	
by	the	Food	and	Allies	Workers	Union	(FAWU).	The	forum	meets	once	a	year	to	bargain	
over	wages	and	conditions	of	employment,	while	other	 issues	are	dealt	with	as	 they	
arise.	The	collective	agreement	covers	about	5	000	workers.
Apart	 from	non-statutory	centralised	collective	bargaining,	non-statutory	bargaining	
also	 takes	place	at	a	decentralised	or	single-employer	 level,	with	examples	 found	 in	
retail	and	food	manufacturing.	For	example,	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Wholesale	and	Retail	
Trade	sector,	collective	bargaining	only	covers	a	small	 fraction	of	 the	sector,	with	 the	
remainder	covered	by	 the	sectoral	determination.	The	South	African	Commercial,	
Catering	and	Allied	Workers	Union	 (SACCAWU)	 is	 the	major	 union	 in	 the	 sector	
and bargains with national groups, medium-sized firms as well as small firms. The 
national firms include the major food, retail and furniture chains. Most of the firms 
bargain	at	a	national	 level	 for	 the	entire	chain.	 If	 they	have	 independent	operations	
or	 franchise	stores	as	part	of	 the	group,	 the	bargaining	unit	does	not	cover	 these.	
There	are	exceptions,	however,	where	the	bargaining	has	been	decentralised	to	each	
individual	store.	 In	 the	 food	manufacturing	sector,	bargaining	takes	place	at	different	
levels depending on the core business of the firms. Certain companies negotiate at a 
central	level	for	different	sub-sectors,	while	others	negotiate	at	plant-level.
Ultimately,	 though,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 wage	 formation	 in	 South	 Africa	 is	
characterised by a number of features which run the gamut from firm-level bargaining 
to	state-mandated	wages	for	organised	workers.	 In	all	cases,	however,	 these	wages	
are	determined	and	negotiated	through	representation	from	employers	and	employees.
5	 These	are	Toyota,	VWSA,	General	Motors,	Nissan,	BMW,	Ford	and	Daimler	Chrysler.
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Extensions	of	and	Exemptions	from	Bargaining	Council	Agreements
As	noted	above,	the	LRA	sets	out	the	procedures	that	have	to	be	followed	in	order	to	
have	a	collective	agreement	extended	to	non-parties.	This	includes	that	the	Minister	of	
Labour has to be satisfied that the trade unions whose members constitute the majority 
of	 the	members	of	 the	party	 trade	unions	and	 the	party	employer	organisations	 that	
employ	the	majority	of	workers	voted	in	favour	of	the	extension.	A	collective	agreement	
is	extended	by	publishing	it	in	the	Government	Gazette.
One	 of	 the	main	 criticisms	 levelled	 against	 the	 extension	 of	 bargaining	 council	
agreements	 is	 that	 large	 firms	 dominate	 the	 employer	 party	 bargaining	 during	
negotiations.	These	agreements	(via	the	extensions)	are	then	imposed	on	parties	that	
did	not	take	part	in	the	negotiations,	particularly	affecting	non-party	SMMEs.	The	aim	of	
the	requirements	in	the	LRA	is	therefore	to	ensure	that	representivity	thresholds	are	met	
before	an	agreement	can	be	extended	and	that	SMMEs	are	adequately	represented	on	
councils (Godfrey et al, 2006: 1). The extension to non-parties was the subject of fierce 
debate	 in	 the	mid-1990s	 in	terms	of	 the	unintended	consequence	 it	ostensibly	had	 in	
increasing regulatory oversight and labour costs for SMMEs. While it is generally difficult 
to	accurately	estimate	the	share	of	workers	covered	by	extensions	of	bargaining	council	
agreements,	Godfrey	et	al	(2006:	24)	has	found	that	of	 the	estimated	32,6	percent	of	
formally	employed	workers	(with	the	total	excluding	all	Managers	and	Professionals	in	
the	private	sector)	covered	by	bargaining	councils,	only	4,6	percent	were	covered	by	
extensions	 to	agreements.	 In	other	words,	extended	bargaining	council	agreements	
covered	a	very	small	share	of	the	labour	force.	This	initial	evidence	does	suggest	that	
the	extension	to	non-parties	as	a	source	of	potential	rigidity	in	the	labour	market,	may	
be	overstated.	Put	differently,	 the	evidence	 that	non-parties	 to	 the	main	bargaining	
council	agreement	suffered	as	a	consequence	of	the	automatic	extension	clause	is	not	
particularly	strong.
The	LRA,	 in	addition,	however,	also	requires	 the	constitution	of	a	bargaining	council	
to	describe	 the	procedures	 to	be	 followed	 for	a	company	 to	obtain	exemption	 from	
some	or	all	 the	clauses	of	an	agreement.	 In	order	 to	comply	with	 this,	most	councils	
have	developed	criteria	for	evaluating	requests	for	exemptions	as	well	as	established	
independent	bodies	to	hear	appeals	when	an	exemption	has	been	denied.	The	criteria	
are	usually	published	in	their	collective	agreements.	The	agreements	can	include	up	to	
eight	or	nine	criteria	without	any	indication,	though,	of	the	weight	of	the	criteria	when	an	
application	for	exemption	is	considered	(Godfrey	et	al,	2006).	This	exemption	system	is	
the	most	important	way	in	which	the	legislation	accommodates	SMMEs	who	may	not	be	
able	to	comply	with	the	requirements	of	bargaining	council	agreements.	Both	employer	
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parties	and	employers	who	are	not	parties	(and	therefore	covered	by	the	extension	of	
an	agreement)	can	apply	for	exemptions	(Godfrey	et	al,	2006:	65).
Godfrey	et	al,	 (2006:	71-79)	examined	 the	data	on	exemptions	 from	17	bargaining	
councils	for	2000,	2002	and	2004.	They	found	that	for	those	years	between	72	percent	
and	78	percent	of	applications	for	exemptions	were	granted,	either	 in	 full,	partially	or	
conditionally.	The	majority	of	applications	were	granted	 in	 full.	They	compared	these	
results	with	data	obtained	from	the	DoL	for	2003	and	2004.	The	DoL	data	covers	44	
councils	 in	2003	and	37	councils	 in	2004	and	shows	a	slightly	higher	success	rate	of	
about	80	percent.	The	evidence	here	is	that	almost	80	percent	exemptions	are	granted.	
This	reinforces	the	view	that	 the	notion	that	 the	extensions-exemptions	clauses	within	
the	regulatory	environment	cannot	legitimately	be	viewed	as	a	source	for	rigidity	in	the	
domestic	labour	market.
The	remainder	of	the	paper	will	attempt	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	industrial	councils	in	
1995	and	bargaining	councils	 in	2005	on	wage	formation	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	
market. Specific issues will be addressed, including the extent of industrial/bargaining 
council	agreements	in	terms	of	the	estimated	share	of	workers	covered	by	agreements.	
Another	important	issue	is	whether	membership	of	a	bargaining	council	affords	a	wage	
premium	to	those	workers	covered	by	the	agreements.	
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 4. Data and Descriptive Overview
 4.1 Data Sources and the Construction of Industrial and Bargaining   
 Council Coverage
In	order	 to	be	able	evaluate	 the	wage	premium	(if	any)	associated	with	membership	
of an industrial or bargaining council, we first had to estimate the number of workers 
covered	by	industrial	council	agreements	in	1995	and	bargaining	council	agreements	in	
2005.
The	 two	sources	of	aggregate	employment	and	wage	data	were	 the	1995	October	
Household	Survey	(OHS)	and	the	September	2005	Labour	Force	Survey	(LFS),	both	
of	which	are	nationally	 representative	household	surveys.	The	OHS	was	conducted	
annually	between	1994	and	1999.	The	LFS	 is	a	biannual	survey	 introduced	 in	2000	
to replace the OHS, with its first useable round conducted in September 2000. The 
1995	OHS	has	been	weighted	using	 the	1996	Census	weights,	while	 the	LFS	has	
been	weighted	using	the	2001	Census.	These	surveys,	however,	did	not	capture	any	
information	on	workers	belonging	to	industrial	or	bargaining	councils	and	coverage	had	
to	be	estimated	using	complementary	sources	of	information.	
Industrial	 council	 coverage	 for	 1995	was	 estimated	 using	 the	 Industrial	 Council	
Digest	(Godfrey,	1992)	and	the	1995	OHS.	The	Industrial	Council	Digest	contains	key	
information	on	the	 industrial	councils	that	operated	in	the	South	African	labour	market	
in	1992.	 It	provides	the	name	of	 the	 industrial	council,	 the	trade	union	and	employer	
organisations	that	were	party	to	the	council,	the	scope	of	the	council,	the	geographical	
area	 the	council	covered,	and	 in	some	 instances	 the	number	of	employees	covered	
by	 the	council.	The	Digest	also	 indicates	whether	 the	council	had	become	 inactive.	
The	 information	on	the	scope	of	 the	councils	was	used	to	 identify	which	sectors	and	
occupations	 industrial	councils	covered.	The	Digest	was	 therefore	 the	source	of	 the	
occupation,	industry	and	geographical	area	covered	by	an	industrial	council.			
The	1995	OHS	contains	 information	on	the	occupation,	 industry	and	the	work	district	
of workers. These are captured by the three digit International Standard Classification 
of	Occupations	(ISCO	88)	codes,	two	digit	Compact	Economic	Sector	Codes	and	three	
digit	district	code.	The	occupation	categories	in	the	OHS	are	broad	and	do	not	include	
specific job titles as in the LFS. The industry categories in the OHS are also broader 
than	those	in	the	LFS,	as	it	 is	recorded	by	a	two	digit	code	and	not	the	more	detailed	
three	digit	code.	This	meant	 that	 the	occupations	and	 industries	used	 to	estimate	
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industrial	council	coverage	 in	1995	may	have	 included	occupations	and	sub-sectors	
which	fell	outside	the	 industrial	council	system	in	1995.	Our	estimation	of	 the	number	
of	workers	covered	by	 industrial	councils	 in	1995	 is	 therefore	 likely	 to	be	an	over-
estimation	of	the	actual	coverage.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	district	code	matched	
was	the	work	district	recorded	in	the	OHS	and	not	the	district	of	residence.	
Although	the	Digest	only	covers	industrial	councils	and	agreements	operating	in	1992,	
following	 the	example	of	Butcher	&	Rouse	(2001)	 it	was	assumed	 that	agreements	
were	renewed	annually	and	 that	 these	councils	were	still	 in	operation	 in	1995.	The	
Digest	was	the	only	reliable	source	available	of	industrial	council	coverage	in	the	early	
nineties.6		
The	Digest	does	contain	 information	on	Municipality	and	Local	Authority	 Industrial	
Councils,	 but	 according	 to	 the	 Digest	 none	 of	 these	 councils	 published	 Main	
Agreements	 that	prescribed	wages.	They	were	therefore	excluded	from	the	analysis.	
Single	 company	 industrial	 councils	were	also	excluded	 from	 the	analysis,	 as	 the	
workers	concerned	were	impossible	to	identify	in	the	OHS.	The	analysis	was	restricted	
to	62	private	sector	industrial	councils,	listed	in	Appendix	A.	The	assumptions	made	in	
terms	of	calculation	of	the	coverage	of	individual	councils	can	be	found	in	the	Technical	
Notes	in	Appendix	C.		
Bargaining	 council	 coverage	 for	 2005	was	 calculated	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	
industrial	 council	 coverage	 for	1995.	The	most	 recent	 list	 of	Bargaining	Councils	
obtained	from	the	Department	of	Labour	(DoL)	website	 is	dated	1	July	2006.	This	 list	
was	used	as	the	starting	point	for	the	estimation	of	bargaining	council	coverage	using	
the	2005	LFS.	The	DoL	list	was	compared	with	 information	from	the	CASE	database	
(2006)	as	well	as	the	list	of	bargaining	councils	in	Godfrey	et	al	(2006:	101,102).	Forty-
eight	bargaining	councils	were	included	in	the	analysis	for	2005	and	these	are	listed	in	
Appendix	B.
Similar	 to	 the	OHS,	 the	LFS	records	 information	on	 the	occupation	and	 industry	of	
workers.	The	LFS	contains	a	more	detailed	 level	of	 information	 than	 the	OHS,	with	
industry	 captured	by	 the	 three	digit	Standard	 Industrial	Classification	 (SIC)	 code	
and	 occupation	 captured	 by	 the	 four	 digit	 South	African	Standard	Classification	
6	 It	was	impossible	to	find	information	on	the	extensions	of,	and	exemptions	from,	industrial	council	agreements.	Given	
the	broadness	of	the	estimated	coverage,	we	can	assume	that	any	extensions	of	agreements	have	automatically	been	
included	in	our	estimation.	
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of	Occupations	 (SASCO)	code.	 In	addition,	 the	area	of	 residence	of	 the	worker	 is	
captured,	but	not	the	work	district.	
As noted above, the scope of a bargaining council is defined by sector, area and/or 
occupation	groups.	Using	this	information	for	each	bargaining	council	we	were	able	to	
estimate	bargaining	council	coverage	for	the	workforce	in	the	LFS.	In	terms	of	obtaining	
the	 scope	 of	 each	 bargaining	 council,	 three	main	 sources	 of	 data	were	 utilised,	
namely	 the	Award	database	 from	 the	Labour	Research	Service7,	 the	Government	
Gazette	notices	of	the	extension	of	bargaining	council	agreements	and	the	websites	of	
bargaining	councils	where	available.	
As	was	the	case	with	the	1995	data,	certain	assumptions	had	to	be	made.	It	was	not	
possible	 to	accurately	match	all	 job	 titles	 listed	 in	 the	agreements	 to	 the	occupation	
titles	in	the	code	list	of	the	LFS.	If	a	job	title	could	not	be	matched	with	an	appropriate	
occupational	 title	 (either	exactly	 the	same	title	or	where	certain	key	words	were	 the	
same)	 they	were	not	 included	 in	 the	coverage.	Fortunately	 this	only	happened	 in	a	
very	small	number	of	cases	(more	 information	can	be	 found	 in	 the	Technical	Notes	
in Appendix D). Where a bargaining council is regional in scope, the area is defined 
in	 terms	of	magisterial	districts.	 In	 the	LFS,	area	of	residence	 is	captured	as	a	metro	
council	or	district	council,	which	are	generally	 larger	areas	 than	municipal	districts,	
meaning	that	in	terms	of	geographical	area,	the	coverage	of	certain	regional	bargaining	
councils	may	have	been	slightly	over-estimated.	The	LFS	does	not	capture	work	district,	
therefore	the	area	of	residence	had	to	be	used.	
Finally,	 there	are	 the	 two	 issues	of	exemptions	 from	bargaining	council	agreements,	
and	extensions	of	agreements	 to	non-parties.	Again,	 it	was	 impossible	 to	capture	
the	exemptions	granted	 from	provisions	of	 the	bargaining	councils.	 In	 terms	of	 the	
extensions of agreements, we are fairly confident that most of these were included in 
the	estimation	of	coverage.	For	 the	majority	of	bargaining	councils	we	were	able	 to	
obtain	Government	Gazette	Notices.	A	bargaining	council	agreement	is	only	published	
in	a	Government	Gazette	 if	 the	Minister	has	given	permission	that	 it	can	be	extended	
to	non-parties,	meaning	 that	all	employers	and	employees	 in	 that	 industry,	area	or	
occupation	group	are	covered	by	the	agreement.			
7	 The	Actual	Wage	Rates	Database	(AWARD)	is	managed	by	the	Labour	Research	Service	and	contains	information	
on	wage	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment	 in	 the	 formal	 economy.	 It	 also	 contains	 information	 of	 some	 of	 the	wage	
agreements	concluded	in	bargaining	councils.	For	more	information	see	http://award.lrs.org.za/home.php
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Ultimately,	 though,	 through	 the	 above,	we	were	 able	 to	 derive	 a	 uniquely	 coded	
representation	of	Bargaining	Councils	and	 its8	membership	 for	all	workers	employed	
in	1995	and	2005.	In	doing	so,	 this	constructed	dataset	provides	for	a	crucial	point	of	
departure into our ability to analyse the nature and influence of this particular labour 
market	institution.
 4.2 Bargaining Council Membership, Employment and Earnings:
 A Descriptive Overview
Table	1	provides	a	snapshot	of	 the	changes	 in	 the	 labour	market	between	1995	and	
2005.	Over	 the	period,	 the	broad	 labour	 force9	 increased	by	46	percent.	Although	
almost	3	million	net	new	 jobs	were	created	between	1995	and	2005	(an	 increase	of	
about	30	percent)	it	was	not	enough	to	absorb	all	the	additional	entrants	to	the	labour	
market	and	broad	unemployment	increased	by	84	percent.	
Table 1:   Descriptive Overview of the Labour Market, 1995 and 2005
1995
(000)
2005
(000)
Change
(000)
Change
(%)
Av. Annual
Growth Rate (%)
Broad Labour Force 13,754 20,100 6,346 46.14
Employment 9,515 12,301 2,786 29.28
Broad Unemployment 4,239 7,800 3,561 84.01
Employed:
Formal 8,120 8,039 -81 -1
Non-formal
(incl. self-employed) 1,394 4,261 2,867 205.67
3.9
2.6
6.3
-0.1
11.8
Source:	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
For	the	purposes	of	our	analysis	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	those	employed	
in	the	formal	and	non-formal	sectors	as	bargaining	council	agreements	potentially	cover	
only	formal	sector	workers	working	for	an	employer.	We	have	therefore	separated	the	
number	of	employed	into	those	in	the	formal	sector	and	those	in	the	non-formal	sector.	
Our definition of non-formal sector employment includes all workers that are either in 
the	 informal	sector10, self-employed or domestic workers. This definition is not strictly 
	 In	 the	remainder	of	 this	document,	 the	 term	bargaining	council	will	be	used	 to	 refer	 to	both	 industrial	councils	and	
bargaining	councils.
9	 Those	between	5	and	65	years	of	age	that	are	willing	and	able	to	work	(including	discouraged	workseekers).
0	 The	LFS	defines	 the	 informal	sector	as	businesses	 that	are	not	 registered	 in	any	way.	They	are	generally	small	 in	
nature	and	seldom	run	from	business	premises.	They	are	instead	run	from	homes,	street	pavements	or	other	informal	
arrangements	(Statistics	SA,	2006:	xxiv).	
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accurate	 in	 terms	of	conventional	 labour	market	analysis	as	 it	 includes	the	(formally)	
self-employed	 in	 the	non-formal	sector,	but	 it	allows	us	 to	group	 together	all	 those	
workers	 that	 fall	outside	 the	coverage	of	 the	bargaining	council	system.	However,	
it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	OHS	1995	did	not	adequately	capture	 informal	sector	
employment,	and	therefore	it	 is	not	possible	to	 identify	the	informally	employed	in	this	
survey. Therefore, the non-formal employment figure for 1995 only includes domestic 
workers11	and	the	self-employed.		
Though	 the	 figures	are	not	directly	comparable	due	 to	 the	data	 issues	highlighted	
above,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 number	 of	workers	 in	 formal	 employment	 remained	
relatively	stable	between	1995	and	2005,	at	 just	over	eight	million.	The	large	increase	
in	 the	non-formal	sector	can	be	attributed	 to	a	much	better	collection	of	data	on	 the	
informally	employed	in	the	LFS	and	a	rapid	rise	in	informal	employment.	
Bargaining	Council	Coverage	by	Sector,	Occupation	and	Union	Status
According	to	our	estimates,	in	1995,	15	percent	of	those	in	formal	employment	(almost	
1,2	million	workers)	were	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	 (see	Table	2).	
This	more	than	doubled	to	2,5	million	workers	or	32	percent	of	 the	formally	employed	
in	2005.	The	2005	aggregate	coverage	estimate,	however,	masks	the	fact	 that	more	
than	half	of	 those	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	 in	2005	were	employed	
in	national,	provincial	and	local	government	departments.	Excluding	the	three	spheres	
of	government,	13	percent	of	those	in	formal	employment	were	covered	by	bargaining	
council	agreements	 in	2005.	This	 translates	 to	 just	over	one	million	private	sector	
workers	–	suggesting	a	marginal	decline	 from	the	number	of	private	sector	workers	
estimated	to	belong	to	bargaining	councils	in	1995.
	 There	is	also	some	confusion	over	the	definition	of	domestic	workers	in	this	survey.	In	our	case	only	domestic	workers	
in	private	households	have	been	considered	to	be	actual	domestic	workers.
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Table 2:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Total Formal Employment 8,120,279 8,039,401
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 32.10%
Private Sector Bargaining Council Coverage 1,193,597 1,072,399
Private Sector BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 13.34%
Government Bargaining Council Coverage 1,507,932
Government BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 18.76%
Source:	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
When	considering	 the	private	sector	bargaining	councils,	 in	both	years,	 the	 largest	
bargaining	 council	 coverage	 was	 accounted	 for	 by	 four	 key	 industries,	 namely	
metal	and	engineering,	 the	motor	 industry	 (which	 includes	vehicle	and	component	
manufacturing,	 retail	and	 repair,	as	well	as	 retail	of	 fuel),	 the	clothing	 industry	and	
construction.12 In 1995, the textile industry accounted for the fifth largest bargaining 
council coverage. Together the top five industries accounted for 10,5 percent of total 
coverage.	In	2005,	the	textile	industry	was	replaced	by	the	councils	for	the	road	freight	
and ferry industries. The top five industries accounted for about nine percent of total 
private	sector	bargaining	council	coverage	in	2005.	
Table	3	presents	 the	bargaining	council	coverage	by	occupation	group	and	sector	 in	
1995	and	2005,	with	the	cells	presenting	the	share	of	the	occupation	group	in	the	total	
bargaining	council	coverage	for	each	sector.13
In	1995	the	Manufacturing	sector	accounted	for	almost	half	of	all	workers	covered	by	
bargaining	council	agreements.	The	only	other	sectors	with	relatively	 large	numbers	
of	workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	were	Trade	and	Construction.	By	2005,	
bargaining	council	 coverage	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector	had	declined	slightly,	 to	
just	below	500	000	–	down	 from	almost	600	000	 in	1995.	This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 the	
fact	 that	 there	was	a	marginal	 increase	 in	 formal	employment	 in	 this	sector	over	 the	
2	 The	estimated	bargaining	council	coverage	by	council	or	industry	(if	there	are	more	than	one	council	in	an	industry)	for	
the	two	years	can	be	found	in	Appendix	G	and	Appendix	I,	respectively.
	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table	as	there	was	no	bargaining	council	
coverage	in	these	sectors	in	995.	In	2005,	there	were	still	no	bargaining	council	coverage	in	Private	Households,	and	
only	2	650	workers	were	estimated	to	be	covered	in	the	other	three	sectors		–		all	of	them	employed	in	the	public	
sector.	The	figures	for	total	employment	and	total	bargaining	council	coverage	do,	however,	include	these	sectors.
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same	period.	As	a	result,	the	share	of	workers	in	the	Manufacturing	sector	covered	by	
bargaining	councils	declined	from	43	percent	to	36	percent.	In	both	years,	the	majority	
of	workers	covered	belonged	 to	 three	occupation	groups,	namely	Craft	and	Trade	
workers,	Operators	and	Assemblers	and	Elementary	workers.	In	terms	of	share	of	total	
sectoral	coverage,	a	marginally	 larger	share	of	 the	Craft	Workers	and	the	Elementary	
Workers	were	covered	in	2005,	with	a	decline	in	the	share	of	Operators.	
The	number	of	Construction	workers	belonging	to	bargaining	councils	almost	halved	
between	1995	and	2005,	 from	230	000	 to	 just	more	 than	114	000.	This	again,	 is	 in	
stark	contrast	to	the	more	than	40	percent	increase	in	formal	sector	employment	in	this	
industry.	Overall,	bargaining	council	coverage	in	this	sector	declined	from	62	percent	to	
31	percent.	In	both	years	the	majority	(70	percent)	of	bargaining	council	members	in	this	
sector	were	Craft	and	Trade	workers,	with	the	second	largest	share	being	Elementary	
workers.	In	2005,	about	a	third	of	Construction	workers	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	
were	members	of	the	public	sector	councils,	meaning	that	the	number	of	private	sector	
workers	that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	actually	declined	to	about	84	000	–	about	
a	third	of	the	number	in	1995.
There	was	a	slight	 increase	in	the	number	of	workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	
in	 the	Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade	sector.	Bargaining	council	 coverage	 increased	
from	about	20	percent	to	24	percent	of	 total	employment	 in	the	sector.	Looking	at	 the	
breakdown	of	coverage	by	occupation	in	this	sector,	marginally	fewer	Clerks	and	Service	
workers	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	in	2005,	with	a	slight	increase	in	the	share	of	
Professionals,	Craft	and	Trade	workers	as	well	as	Operators	and	Elementary	Workers.	
Bargaining	council	coverage	in	the	Transport	sector	more	than	doubled	between	1995	
and	2005,	with	 the	 increase	partly	driven	by	 the	50	000	workers	belonging	 to	 the	
Transnet	bargaining	council.	The	share	of	workers	 in	 this	sector	covered	by	councils	
increased	from	about	18	percent	to	almost	42	percent.	Membership	of	the	State	Owned	
Enterprise’s bargaining council significantly changed the occupational composition in 
this	sector.	 In	1995,	 the	majority	of	bargaining	council	members	 in	 this	sector	were	
Operators	and	Assemblers,	with	a	96	percent	share.	By	2005,	this	share	has	declined	
to	62	percent,	while	the	share	of	Elementary	workers	covered	more	than	doubled	–	from	
four	percent	to	11.5	percent.	In	addition,	the	Transnet	bargaining	council	accounted	for	
most	of	the	Professionals,	Clerical	workers	and	Service	Workers	covered	by	Transport	
bargaining	councils	in	2005.	
In	 2005,	 total	 bargaining	 council	 coverage	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 large	 number	 of	
bargaining	council	members	 in	the	Commercial,	Social	and	Personal	Services	Sector,	
which	in	turn	is	dominated	by	members	of	the	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	In	fact,	
1.3	million	of	the	1.5	million	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	(from	three	levels	
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of	government)	were	employed	 in	 this	sector.	This	also	accounts	 for	 the	 increased	
share	and	number	of	Professionals	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	 this	sector.	 In	
1995,	42	percent	of	 the	workers	 in	 the	CSPS	sector	covered	by	bargaining	councils	
were	Professionals.	In	absolute	terms	this	amounted	to	only	10	000	workers.	By	2005,	
Professionals	accounted	for	52	percent	of	coverage	in	this	sector,	which	is	an	increase	
of	 ten	percentage	points.	 In	absolute	numbers,	however,	 the	 increase	was	huge,	with	
more	 than	700	000	Professionals	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	2005.	Overall,	
Professionals	 increased	 their	share	 in	 total	bargaining	council	 coverage	 from	 two	
percent	 to	30	percent	–	driven	largely	by	the	 increase	in	the	number	of	Professionals	
covered in the CSPS sector. The second sector that benefited significantly from the 
increase	 in	 the	bargaining	council	membership	of	public	sector	Professionals,	was	
the	Financial	and	Business	Services	Sector,	with	 the	share	of	Professionals	 in	 total	
sectoral	coverage	 jumping	from	zero	to	30	percent.	Again,	membership	of	 the	public	
sector	bargaining	councils	accounted	for	the	bulk	of	the	increase	in	bargaining	council	
coverage	 in	Finance	 in	2005,	with	both	Clerks	and	Elementary	Workers	seeing	huge	
increases	in	their	share	of	sectoral	coverage.14
	 These	are	workers	that	indicated	in	the	LFS	that	they	work	in	Finance	in	one	of	the	three	spheres	of	government.
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Table 3:  Bargaining Council Coverage by Occupation Group and Sector – % share of sector
Manufacturing Construction
Wholesale &
Retail Trade Transport
Financial
Services
Commercial
Services Total
1995 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Managers 2005 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
1995 0.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.1 1.9
Professionals 2005 1.0 0.1 2.1 3.4 26.9 51.9 28.9
1995 4.4 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6
Clerical Workers 2005 4.9 2.0 7.4 9.3 28.3 12.5 10.2
1995 0.0 0.0 55.5 0.0 0.0 43.9 13.5
Service & Sales Workers 2005 1.1 0.6 41.1 5.3 7.6 16.7 15.0
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Skilled Agriculture
& Fishing Workers 2005 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
1995 28.0 70.6 32.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9
Craft & Trade Workers 2005 37.0 70.4 37.4 8.4 1.9 2.7 17.2
1995 51.7 4.7 0.5 96.0 0.0 2.7 32.8
Operators & Assemblers 2005 36.6 3.5 3.3 62.0 2.6 2.4 13.3
1995 15.6 19.8 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 11.8
Elementary Workers 2005 19.4 23.4 7.7 11.5 32.7 13.6 15.0
1995 591,321 230,279 271,370 76,188 1,192 23,248 1,193,597
BC members 2005 486,583 114,228 332,664 179,200 84,124 1,358,171 2,580,331
1995 1,362,063 374,420 1,367,718 431,020 530,455 2,117,455 8,120,279
Formal Employment 2005 1,394,240 536,160 1,630,919 429,091 1,087,271 1,901,858 8,039,401
1995 43.41 61.50 19.84 17.68 0.22 1.10 14.70BC as share of
Formal Employment 2005 35.72 30.51 24.32 41.58 15.86 64.14 31.78
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Private Sector BC (%) 2005 96.5 73.8 94.8 89.7 19.6 1.9 41.6
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Sector BC (%) 2005 3.5 26.2 5.2 10.3 80.4 98.1 58.5
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
 figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	
 were included in the total employment figure. 
Table	4	again	presents	that	breakdown	of	bargaining	council	membership	by	occupation	
group	and	sector	for	both	years.	In	this	case,	the	cells	present	the	share	of	each	sector	
in	total	bargaining	council	coverage	by	occupation	group.	
The	increase	in	bargaining	council	membership	by	occupation	group	between	1995	and	
2005	was	dominated	by	the	huge	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	Professionals	belonging	
to	bargaining	councils,	 from	 just	over	20	000	 in	1995	 to	more	 than	 three-quarters	
of	a	million	 in	2005.	This	 is	a	consequence	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	public	sector	
bargaining	councils.	 In	1995,	almost	half	of	Professionals	belonging	 to	bargaining	
councils	were	employed	in	the	Construction	industry,	while	43	percent	were	employed	
in	 the	CSPS	sector.	A	 further	seven	percent	belonged	 to	bargaining	councils	 in	 the	
Manufacturing	sector.	By	2005,	more	 than	94	percent	of	Professional	bargaining	
council	members	were	employed	 in	the	CSPS	sector.	This	translates	 into	an	 increase	
of	more	than	7	000	percent	or	almost	700	000	workers.	Overall,	almost	98	percent	of	
Professional	bargaining	council	members	were	employed	in	the	public	sector	 in	2005.	
The	majority	of	these	workers	were	teachers	and	nurses	employed	by	government.			
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The number of Clerical Workers covered by bargaining councils increased almost five-
fold	between	1995	and	2005.	Again	this	increase	was	driven	by	the	establishment	of	the	
pubic	sector	bargaining	councils,	with	public	sector	workers	accounting	for	79	percent	
of	all	Clerks	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	2005.	The	share	of	Clerks	covered	by	
bargaining	councils	 in	 the	Manufacturing	 industry	decreased	from	48	percent	 to	nine	
percent,	while	 the	share	of	Clerks	 that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	 in	 the	Trade	
sector	declined	from	52	percent	to	9	percent.	Over	the	same	period,	the	share	of	Clerks	
employed	 in	 the	CSPS	 increased	 from	zero	 to	65	percent.	This	share	 is	dominated	
by	Clerks	working	 in	 the	public	sector.	Overall,	bargaining	council	coverage	 in	 this	
occupation group increased from almost five percent of total employment to more than 
23	percent.
The	number	of	Service	and	Sales	Workers	belonging	to	bargaining	councils	more	than	
doubled	from	about	161	000	 in	1995	to	almost	387	000	 in	2005.	 In	2005,	almost	58	
percent	of	these	workers	were	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	Most	of	the	Services	
Workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	1995	were	employed	 in	 the	Wholesale	
and	Retail	Trade	industry.	This	share	declined	to	35	percent	in	2005,	with	the	share	of	
Service	Workers	employed	in	the	CSPS	increasing	from	six	percent	to	59	percent.	This	
is dominated by police officers and to lesser extent prison warders.15	The	small	number	
of	skilled	Agricultural	and	Fishing	workers	within	a	bargaining	council	in	2005,	were	all	
employed	in	the	public	service.	
Craft	and	Trade	worker	bargaining	council	membership	 remained	 relatively	stable	
between	1995	and	2005,	with	about	40	percent	employed	in	the	Manufacturing	sector	
in	both	years.	The	share	of	this	occupation	group	in	the	Construction	industry	declined,	
with	small	 increases	 in	 the	other	sector.	Only	13	percent	of	covered	Craft	and	Trade	
workers	were	part	of	public	sector	councils.	
5	 Our	estimates	suggest	that	the		226	police	officers	and	2	0	wardens	belonged	to	the	public	sector	bargaining	
council	in	2005.
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Table 4:  Bargaining Council Coverage by Occupation Group and Sector – % Share of   
 Occupation Group 
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
 figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	
 were included in the total employment figure.
	
There	was	a	slight	decline	between	1995	and	2005	in	the	number	of	covered	Operators	
and	Assemblers.	 In	 1995,	 the	majority	 of	 these	 workers	 were	 employed	 in	 the	
Manufacturing	sector	with	the	share	of	Operators	in	this	sector	declining	to	52	percent	
in	2005.	The	 largest	share	 increase	was	 in	 the	Transport	sector,	driven	by	 increased	
membership	in	the	motor	ferry	and	passenger	transport	bargaining	councils,	as	well	as	
the	establishment	of	the	Transnet	bargaining	council.	
The	majority	of	unskilled	Elementary	workers	 in	a	bargaining	council	 in	1995	were	
employed	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector.	While	 the	total	number	of	Elementary	workers	
council-covered	increased	from	141	000	to	388	000,	the	share	of	Elementary	workers	
within	Manufacturing,	declined	to	24	percent.	There	was	a	similar	decline	in	the	share	
of	covered	Elementary	workers	 in	 the	Construction	 industry.	While	no	Elementary	
workers	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	 in	CSPS	in	1995,	a	decade	later,	48	percent	
of	all	Elementary	workers	belonging	to	bargaining	councils	were	employed	in	the	CSPS	
sector.			
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Table	 5	 shows	 the	 union	membership	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 bargaining	 council	
environment	in	1995	and	2005.16	
Table 5:  Bargaining Council Status and Union Membership, 1995 and 2005
Bargaining Council Non-Bargaining Council Formal Employment
Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total
1995 466,827 726,770 1,193,597 2,274,483 4,652,199 6,926,682 2,741,311 5,378,968 8,120,279
39.11% 60.89% 100% 32.84% 67.16% 100% 33.76% 66.24% 100%
2005 1,407,344 1,172,987 2,580,331 1,609,057 3,850,012 5,459,070 3,016,401 5,023,000 8,039,401
54.54% 45.46% 100% 29.47% 70.53% 100% 37.52% 62.48% 100%
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
In	 1995,	 about	 40	 percent	 of	workers	 (just	 fewer	 than	 half	 a	million	 employees)	
estimated	to	be	covered	by	a	bargaining	council,	were	also	members	of	a	trade	union.	
This	means	that	the	majority	of	the	workers	that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	were	
not	members	of	a	union.	By	2005	 this	share	has	 increased	 to	almost	55	percent,	
with	 the	actual	number	of	workers	belonging	 to	both	a	bargaining	council	and	union	
increasing	 threefold	 to	almost	1,5	million.	This	 increase	was	primarily	driven	by	 the	
large	number	of	public	sector	workers	belonging	 to	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	
union,	with	almost	70	percent	of	 the	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	also	
unionised.17	It	has	to	be	noted	that	this	rapid	bargaining	council-union	membership	also	
took	place	astride	a	very	modest	growth	in	trade	union	membership	as	a	whole.
From	the	above	descriptive	overview,	a	number	of	key	conclusions	emerge	around	the	
patterns	of	 institutionalised	wage	formation	 in	post-apartheid South Africa. In the first 
instance	the	 level	of	 institutionalised	wage	bargaining,	outside	of	union	membership,	
only covered 15 percent of workers in 1995. A decade later this figure, although more 
than	doubling,	 stood	only	at	32	percent.	Put	differently,	 the	system	of	bargaining	
councils	 in	South	Africa	designed	 to	 formalise	 the	 relationship	between	organised	
workers and employers with regard to wages; benefits; dispute resolution and other 
aspects	of	 labour	market	regulation,	remains	relatively	weak	and	unrepresentative	at	
the	national	 level.	That	being	said,	a	second	key	conclusion	 from	the	above	 is	 that,	
the 1995-2005 period reflects a rapid rise in the bargaining council system for the 
6	 Note	that	while	the	bargaining	council	membership	was	estimated	for	both	years,	the	union	membership	is	based	on	
the	responses	to	very	specific	questions	in	the	995	OHS	and	the	2005	LFS.
7	 The	 key	 public	 sector	 trade	 unions	 are	 the	 National,	 Education,	 Health	 and	 Allied	 Workers’	 Union	 (NEHAWU),	
Democratic	 Nursing	 Organisation	 of	 SA	 (DENOSA),	 Health	 and	 Other	 Service	 Personnel	 Trade	 Union	 of	 SA	
(HOSPERSA),	National	Professional	Teachers’	Organisation	of	SA	(NAPTOSA),	Police	and	Prisons	Civil	Rights	Union	
(POPCRU),	Public	Servants	Association	of	South	Africa	(PSA),	South	African	Democratic	Teachers’	Union	(SADTU)	
and	South	African	Police	Union	(SAPU)	(PSCBC	website,	www.pscbc.org.za).	
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public	sector.	Driven	by	the	formalisation	of	 teachers,	nurses	and	other	public	sector	
Professionals	 into	 the	Public	Sector	Co-ordinating	Bargaining	Council	–	 this	sector	 is	
now	the	bedrock	for	institutionalised	bargaining	in	the	labour	market.	In	turn,	however,	
bargaining	councils	within	 the	private	sector	have	at	best	stagnated	and	at	worst	are	
in	secular	decline.	Hence,	despite	aggregate	employment	growth	 in	sectors	such	as	
Construction	and	Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade,	bargaining	council	membership	has	not	
expanded accordingly. Where there has been significant growth, it has notably been 
within	State	Owned	Enterprise-related	sectors.	Finally,	 this	poor	performance	within	
the	private	sector	alludes	to	an	additional	worrying	trend;	that	of	the	failure	to	resort	to	
established	practices	of	 institutionalised	bargaining	and	dispute	resolution	within	new	
or	fast-growing	sectors.	This	 is	particularly	 important	when	those	sectors	or	 industries	
have	low	levels	of	unionisation	and	employers’	organisation	–	as	 it	often	provides	the	
seedbed	for	a	fractious	industrial	relations	environment.18
Earnings	in	the	Bargaining	Council	System
As	noted	earlier,	domestic	workers,	the	self-employed	and	the	informal	sector	(in	2005)	
were	excluded	 from	the	estimation	of	bargaining	council	coverage.	 In	 the	 following	
tables	the	earnings19	of	employees	that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	in	the	two	years	
(as	per	our	estimation	of	coverage)	are	compared	to	the	earnings	of	those	workers	that	
were	employed	in	the	formal	sector	but	did	not	belong	to	a	bargaining	council.	
Table	6	provides	a	comparison	of	the	real20	mean	monthly	earnings	of	all	formal	sector	
employees	by	their	bargaining	council	status	in	1995	and	2005.	In	addition,	the	ratio	of	
bargained	to	non-bargained	wages	is	given,	as	well	as	the	growth	in	earnings	over	the	
period	–	both	for	workers	that	belonged	to	a	bargaining	council	and	those	that	did	not.	
In	 both	 1995	 and	 2005,	 the	 aggregate	 estimates	 indicate	 that	membership	 of	 a	
bargaining	council	was	not	associated	with	higher	mean	earnings.	 In	both	years,	 the	
difference	in	the	mean	earnings	of	employees	inside	and	outside	the	bargaining	council	
	 While	this	point	is	a	strong	reference	to	the	security	and	taxi	industries,	it	represents	a	general	concern	around	other	
sectors	whose	future	growth	may	result	in	deleterious	industrial	relations	outcomes.	
9	 The	earnings	figures	reported	here	are	monetary	earnings.	Where	respondents	in	the	OHS	and	LFS	chose	an	income	
bracket	instead	of	 indicating	an	actual	 income	figure,	the	midpoint	value	of	that	bracket	was	given	to	them.	In	both	
years,	however,	the	majority	of	respondents	provided	an	actual	income	estimate.	Looking	at	formal	employment	only,	
in	2005	62	percent	of	respondents	provided	point	estimates,	with	less	than	one	percent	unspecified	(missing).	In	995	
2,	percent	of	the	values	were	missing,	while	7	percent	of	respondents	provided	point	estimates.	
20	 Nominal	 earnings	were	 converted	 into	 real	 earnings	 (expressed	 in	 2000	 prices)	 using	 the	Consumer	 Price	 Index	
(StatsSA,	2006).
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environment	 is	not	statistically	significant.	 In	1995,	 the	only	statistically	significant	
difference	 in	 earnings	 are	 for	Asian	 workers,	 with	 employees	 not	 belonging	 to	
a	bargaining	council	actually	earning	almost	one	and	a	half	 times	more	 than	 their	
counterparts	who	were	members	of	a	bargaining	council.	
Table 6:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender and Bargaining   
   Council Membership, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005 % change
Rands BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to
Non-
BC) BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to
Non-
BC) BC Non-BC
African 2043.32 2076.94 1:1.02 2996.83 2158.82 1:0.72* 46.66** 3.94
Coloured 2312.64 2070.22 1:0.90 3225.45 2794.53 1:0.87 39.47** 34.99**
Asian 2842.48 4001.30 1:1.41* 3908.88 3427.78 1:0.88 37.52 -14.33
White 5680.86 6221.95 1:1.10 5618.87 6961.31 1:1.24* -1.09 11.88
Male 2953.47 3142.55 1:1.06 3396.83 3398.64 1:1.00 15.01** 8.15
Female 1842.82 2695.76 1:1.46* 3499.99 3038.92 1:0.87 89.93** 12.73
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
 ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
In	2005,	however,	African	employees	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	
earned significantly more than those workers not belonging to a bargaining council, 
driven by a statistically significant increase of 47 percent in real earnings between 
1995	and	2005.	The	differences	in	the	earnings	of	Coloured	and	Asian	workers	inside	
and outside the bargaining council environment are not statistically significant. It is 
interesting	 to	note	 that	White	workers	who	did	not	belong	 to	a	bargaining	council	
earned	more	 than	 those	 that	were	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement,	with	
the difference statistically significant. This is probably a reflection of the relatively large 
share	of	White	workers	 in	highly	skilled	occupations	 falling	outside	 the	bargaining	
council	system.
In 1995 there was no statistically significant difference in Male earnings between those 
that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	and	those	that	did	not.	Females,	however,	who	
did	not	belong	to	a	bargaining	council	earned	on	average	almost	50	percent	more	than	
females	 that	were	members	of	a	bargaining	council,	with	 the	difference	statistically	
significant.	 In	 2005	 the	 earnings	 of	Males	 and	Females	 belonging	 to	 bargaining	
councils	were	not	statistically	different	from	those	not	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	
agreement. However, female bargaining council members saw a statistically significant 
increase	 of	 almost	 90	 percent	 in	 their	mean	 earnings	 between	 1995	 and	 2005.	
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This	 reflects	 the	 large	 number	 of	 nurses	 and	 female	 teachers	 covered	 by	
bargaining	 council	 agreements	 in	 2005	 due	 to	 their	membership	 of	 the	PSCBC.
Table	7,	however,	shows	that	when	the	earnings	of	public	sector	bargaining	members	
are	compared	to	those	of	bargaining	council	members	in	the	private	sector	as	well	as	
those	not	covered	by	bargaining	councils	a	different	picture	emerges.	At	the	aggregate	
level	 in	2005,	workers	who	were	part	of	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils	earned	
more	 than	 their	colleagues	 in	 the	private	sector	as	well	as	 the	 formally	employed	
who	did	not	belong	to	bargaining	councils.	 In	both	cases	the	difference	 is	statistically	
significant, with public sector bargaining council members earning about 30 percent 
more	than	workers	not	part	of	any	bargaining	council,	while	the	difference	was	almost	
90	percent	between	the	public	and	private	sector	bargaining	council	members.	
Table 7:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender:  Private vs Public Sector Bargaining 
 Council Membership, 2005
Non BC Private BC Public BC
Ratio Priv BC:
Pub BC
Ratio Non-BC:
Pub BC
African 2158.82 1738.45 3829.55 1:2.20* 1:1.77*
Coloured 2794.53 2510.62 4017.41 1:1.60* 1:1.44*
Asian 3427.78 3382.69 4582.80 1:1.35 1:1.34
White 6961.31 4481.74 6220.84 1:1.39* 1:0.89
Male 3398.64 2560.05 4296.07 1:1.68* 1:1.26*
Female 3038.92 1521.38 4220.95 1:2.77* 1:1.39*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:		 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
African workers benefited most from being members of the public sector bargaining 
councils	 in	2005,	with	 their	mean	earnings	more	 than	double	 that	of	private	sector	
bargaining	council	members	and	almost	80	percent	more	than	those	of	workers	that	did	
not	belong	to	any	bargaining	council.	The	same	trend	is	evident	for	Coloured	workers,	
with	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	earning	60	percent	more	 than	 those	
that	belonged	to	private	sector	councils	and	44	percent	more	than	those	outside	the	
bargaining	council	system.	Public	sector	bargaining	council	membership	had	no	impact	
on	the	earnings	of	Asian	workers.	The	difference	 in	earnings	between	White	workers	
were statistically significant, with the public sector workers earning almost 40 percent 
more.	The	difference	 in	earnings	between	White	workers	belonging	 to	a	bargaining	
council and those within a public sector bargaining council is not statistically significant. 
In terms of our gender estimates, females benefited most from public sector bargaining 
council	membership,	with	 these	workers	 earning	almost	 three	 times	as	much	as	
females	belonging	to	private	councils	and	almost	40	percent	more	than	females	who	
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did	not	belong	to	any	bargaining	council.	Men	who	belonged	to	public	sector	bargaining	
councils	earned	on	average	about	 two-thirds	more	than	those	 in	private	councils	and	
almost a third more than males not within a bargaining council. Overall, this reflects the 
premium	earned	by	professionals	such	as	nurses	and	teachers	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	
police officers in the public sector. 
Table	8	examines	 real	mean	monthly	earnings	by	bargaining	councils	 status	and	
occupation	group.	The	only	occupation	group	where	bargaining	council	workers	earned	
more	 in	both	years	than	those	not	covered	 is	unskilled	Elementary	Workers,	with	 the	
differences statistically significant. Elementary Workers not part of a bargaining council 
earned	about	60	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	1995,	
and	about	56	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	2005.			
In 2005, the only other occupation category that benefited from being covered by a 
bargaining	council	agreement	were	Service	and	Sales	Workers,	whose	earnings	were	
almost	double	those	of	non-bargaining	council	service	workers.	This	can	be	attributed	to	
the fact that police officers and correctional services workers (who fall in this category), 
were	covered	by	the	new	public	sector	bargaining	councils	 in	2005	but	uncovered	 in	
1995.
 Table 8:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation and Bargaining
 
      Council Membership, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005 % Change
Rands BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to Non-
BC) BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to Non-
BC) BC Non-BC
Managers 5737.10 8854.87 1:1.54* 3444.90 9578.95 1:2.78* -39.95 8.18
Professionals 7827.58 5505.90 1:0.70* 5345.21 6553.86 1:1.23* -31.71** 19.03
Clerks 2941.33 3029.92 1:1.03 3868.12 3273.02 1:0.85 31.51** 8.02
Service Workers 2239.59 2479.59 1:1.11 3006.73 1597.00 1:0.53* 34.25 -35.59**
Skilled Agr.
Workers 2521.79 2120.47 2750.13 1:1.30 9.05
Craft & Trade
Workers 3091.59 3267.50 1:1.06 2452.81 2219.72 1:0.90 -20.66 -32.07**
Operators &
Assemblers 2436.65 2082.94 1:0.85* 2379.27 2121.28 1:0.89 -2.35 1.84
Elementary
Workers 1665.31 993.96 1:0.60* 2042.01 1149.60 1:0.56* 22.62 15.66**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:		 	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
 ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
Operators	and	Assemblers	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	earned	more	
than	those	outside	bargaining	councils	in	1995,	with	the	difference	no	longer	statistically	
significant in 2005. In 1995, the very small number of Professionals who belonged to a 
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bargaining	council	earned	more	than	those	outside	the	system.	By	2005,	Professionals	
outside	the	bargaining	council	system	earned	more	than	those	covered	by	agreements.	
Finally,	in	both	years	Managers	not	covered	by	agreement	earned	more	than	those	who	
belonged	to	bargaining	councils.	This	is	not	surprising	given	the	very	small	number	of	
managers	who	actually	belonged	to	councils.	For	Clerks	and	Craft	and	Trade	workers	
in	both	years,	Service	Workers	 in	1995,	and	 for	Agricultural	Workers	 in	2005,	 the	
differences in the levels of earnings are not statistically significant.  
In	 Table	 9	 we	 again	 compare	 the	 earnings	 of	 workers	 part	 of	 the	 public	 sector	
bargaining	councils	with	 the	earnings	of	 those	who	were	members	of	private	sector	
bargaining	councils	 in	2005.	Professionals	 in	 the	public	sector	bargaining	council	
earned	on	average	almost	50	percent	more	than	their	counterparts	that	belonged	to	the	
private	sector	councils.	However,	Professionals	who	did	not	belong	to	any	bargaining	
council	still	earned	more	 than	 the	public	sector	Professionals.	Nurses	and	 teachers	
belong	to	the	public	sector	bargaining	councils,	and	this	could	account	for	the	earnings	
gap	between	the	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	However,	high	earning	
Professionals	such	as	chartered	accountants,	actuaries	and	 lawyers	 in	 the	private	
sector	do	not	belong	 to	bargaining	councils,	hence,	suggesting	why	Professionals	
outside	the	bargaining	council	environment	have	the	highest	mean	earnings.	
Table 9:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation Group:  Private versus Public Sector  
 Bargaining Council Membership, 2005
Non-BC Private BC Public BC
Ratio
Priv BC: Pub BC
Ratio
Non-BC: Pub BC
Managers 9578.95 3444.90
Professionals 6553.86 3484.41 5382.01 1:1.54* 1:0.82*
Clerks 3273.02 3010.72 4103.71 1:1.36 1:1.25*
Service Workers 1597.00 1904.62 3799.76 1:2.00* 1:2.38*
Skilled Agr Workers 2750.13 2120.47 1:0.77
Craft & Trade Workers 2219.72 2458.70 2412.40 1:0.98 1:1.09
Operators & Assemblers 2121.28 2218.76 3189.78 1:1.44 1:1.50
Elementary Workers 1149.60 1968.76 2091.25 1:1.06 1:1.82*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:			 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
The	mean	earnings	of	Service	Workers	in	the	public	sector	were	double	that	of	Service	
Workers	that	belonged	to	private	sector	bargaining	councils	and	almost	two-and-a-half	
times more than that of their colleagues outside the council system. This reflects the 
wage premium earned by police officers and prison wardens in the public sector. 
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When	earnings	are	differentiated	by	 industry	(Table	10),	 it	 is	clear	 that	 in	most	cases	
differences	 in	earnings	between	workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	and	 those	
outside the system are not statistically significant. There are, however, some exceptions. 
In	Transport	and	Manufacturing,	workers	not	covered	by	bargaining	councils	earned	
more	 in	both	years.	For	both	sectors,	 these	workers	earned	around	50	percent	more	
than	their	colleagues,	with	differential	widening	slightly	in	2005.	
Table 10:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Industry and Bargaining Council Status, 
    1995 and 2005
1995 2005 % Change
BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to
Non-
BC BC Non-BC
Ratio
(BC to
Non-
BC BC Non-BC
Agriculture 789.32 1707.75 950.03 1:0.56* 20.36
Mining & Quarrying 3176.01 2820.05 3310.10 1:1.17 4.22
Manufacturing 2680.99 3870.90 1:1.44* 2298.83 3819.50 1:1.66* -14.25 -1.33
Utilities 4384.73 2956.54 4585.29 1:1.55 4.57
Construction 2658.29 2531.11 1:0.95 2319.21 2066.21 1:0.89 -12.76 -18.37
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2612.20 2457.50 1:0.94 2235.11 2377.66 1:1.06 -14.44 -3.25
Transport 2529.67 4045.35 1:1.60* 2603.98 4587.15 1:1.76* 2.94 13.39
Financial & Business
Services 1153.98 4570.14 1:3.96* 4070.34 4689.15 1:1.15 252.72** 2.60
Commercial, Social
& Prof Services 3953.48 3628.25 1:0.92 4317.75 4602.46 1:1.07 9.21 26.85**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
 ** Changes significant at the five percent level
Bargaining	council	members	 in	 the	Financial	Services	sector	experienced	a	huge	
increase	in	their	mean	earnings	between	1995	and	2005,	driven	again	by	public	sector	
workers	 in	 this	sector	who	 joined	 the	PSCBC.	The	only	sector	wherein	bargaining	
council	members	earned	more	 than	non-members	(and	 the	difference	 is	statistically	
significant),	was	Agriculture,	Forestry	&	Fishing	 in	2005	–	driven	by	public	sector	
employees	who	indicated	that	they	belong	to	this	sector.		
Our	descriptive	analysis	has	shown	 that	an	estimated	15	percent	of	 formal	sector	
workers	were	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	 in	1995,	with	 these	 limited	
to	private	sector	councils.	By	2005,	 this	had	 increased	 to	about	30	percent	of	 total	
formal	employment,	with	 the	 increase	driven	almost	entirely	by	membership	of	 the	
newly	formed	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	The	number	of	private	sector	workers	
covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	remained	relatively	stable	at	around	1	million	
workers.	Ultimately	 then,	 there	has	been	a	stagnation	 in	growth	of	bargaining	council	
representation	 for	private	sector	employees,	with	aggregate	growth	 in	bargaining	
council	membership	a	 function	entirely	 of	 the	PSBC’s	 formation.	The	descriptive	
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analysis of earnings, in turn, suggests firstly that at the mean, there was no significant 
remunerative	advantage	offered	to	being	associated	with	a	bargaining	council.	Closer	
inspection	of	 the	mean	earnings	of	bargaining	council	members,	however,	 revealed	
significant premia associated with membership of public sector bargaining councils. 
Hence,	the	aggregate	level,	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	not	only	earned	
more	 than	 their	private	sector	counterparts,	but	also	on	average	more	 than	workers	
who	did	not	belong	to	a	bargaining	council	at	all.	This	result	holds	true	for	males	and	
females,	as	well	as	Africans	and	Coloureds.	The	same	trend	emerges	when	examining	
average	earnings	by	occupation	group.	
While	mean	earnings	were	presented	by	a	range	of	covariates,	noted	above,	 these	
are	of	course	not	 the	only	 factors	 impacting	on	a	worker’s	earnings.	A	wide	 range	
of variables, including the highest level of education and experience also influence 
earnings.	 In	addition,	 these	variables	 interact	simultaneously	 to	 impact	on	earnings.	
In	 the	 following	section,	 therefore,	we	estimate	a	 range	of	earnings	 functions	 in	an	
attempt	 to	account	 for	 the	simultaneous	 impact	of	 relevant	variables	on	 the	 level	of	
earnings.	 In	addition,	 it	will	allow	us	 to	 isolate	 the	 impact	of	bargaining	council	and	
union	membership	on	earnings.
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 5. Bargaining Council Membership and Wages - 
 A Multivariate Analysis
We	follow	Bhorat	and	Leibbrandt	(2001:	107-129)	 in	setting	up	a	model	which	deals	
with	 the	 three	sequential	stages	 in	 the	 labour	market:	 labour	market	participation,	
employment	and	earnings.	Given	the	high	levels	of	involuntary	unemployment	in	South	
Africa,	they	have	argued	that	it	is	important	to	include	both	labour	market	participation	
and employment equations in the analysis, to clearly define unemployment as a state 
that	occurs	despite	the	decision	to	enter	the	labour	market.
It	is	a	well	established	fact	in	the	literature	that	the	sample	of	labour	market	participants	
is	highly	unlikely	to	be	a	random	sample	of	 the	working	age	population.	The	group	of	
potential	 labour	market	participants	has	already	undergone	some	kind	of	selection	
process	 whereby	 a	 decision	 was	made	 to	 enter	 the	 labour	market	 or	 not.	 The	
participation	equation,	therefore,	attempts	to	shed	some	light	on	the	factors	 impacting	
on	an	 individual’s	decision	 to	enter	 the	 labour	 force.	We	begin	with	a	 full	sample	of	
potential	 labour	market	participants	and	estimate	a	participation	probit	using,	amongst	
other variables, a number of household specific variables that would impact on an 
individual’s	decision	to	enter	the	labour	market.	Once	the	participants	are	determined,	
an	employment	probit	model	 is	estimated,	conditional	on	 labour	 force	participation.	
The final stage models the earnings of those who found employment (See Bhorat & 
Leibbrandt,	2001:	112,113;	Oosthuizen,	2006:	53).21
The	results	from	the	labour	force	participation	probit	for	1995	and	2005	can	be	found	in	
Appendix	E,	while	the	results	from	the	employment	probit	for	both	years	can	be	found	
in	Appendix	F.	
Given	our	interest	here,	we	focus	principally	on	the	wage	equation.	Hence,	an	earnings	
function	takes	the	following	generic	form:		
	 	 	 	 Y
i
 = a + b  X
i
 + u
i
	 	 	 (1)
2	 In	our	analysis,	the	Heckman	two-step	approach	was	used	to	control	for	sample	selection	bias.	After	the	labour	force	
participation	probit	was	estimated,	the	estimates	were	used	to	derive	an	estimate	for	the	inverse	Mills	ratio	(lambda)	
to	be	included	in	the	employment	probit.	The	selection	lambda	derived	from	the	employment	probit	was	then	included	
in	the	earnings	equation.	The	derived	earnings	function	is	therefore	conditional	on	the	individual	characteristics	of	the	
earners	as	well	as	conditional	on	the	fact	that	these	earners	are	a	subsample	of	all	labour	market	participants	and	an	
even	smaller	subsample	of	potential	participants.
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where	the	Y
i
 refers	to	the	natural	log	of	the	monthly	wage	of	worker	i 	as	being	a	function	
of	the	kx1 vector,	X	of		relevant	variables,	while	b	is	the	1xk	vector	of	parameters.	The	
disturbance	term	and	the	constant	are	captured	by	u
i
 and	a	respectively.	The	Ordinary	
Least	Squares	method	is	used	to	estimate	the	mean	effect	of	 the	various	explanatory	
variables	on	the	dependent	variable.	
While	there	are	well-known	advantages	to	the	OLS	approach,	this	paper	also	attempts	
to	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 different	 covariates	 –	 particularly	 that	 of	 union	 and	
bargaining	council	membership	–	at	different	points	on	the	conditional	wage	distribution.	
Put differently, whether bargaining council membership is significant in shaping earnings 
at	 the	10th,	as	opposed	to	 the	75th	or	 the	90th	percentile	of	 the	wage	distribution	 is	of	
substantive	interest	here.
Hence,	in	order	to	estimate	the	impact	of	the	explanatory	variables	at	particular	points	
in	the	wage	distribution,	the	method	of	quantile	regressions	is	utilised.	First	proposed	in	
Koenker	and	Bassett	(1978),	quantile	regressions	refer	to	the	generalised	case	of	 the	
least	absolute	deviations	(LAD)	estimator.	Hence,	while	through	ordinary	least	squared	
estimation,	we	derive	a	sample	mean	through	minimising	the	sum	of	squared	residuals,	
the	sample	median	can	be	derived	through	minimising	the	sum	of	absolute	residuals	
(Koenker	&	Hallock,	2001;	Koenker	&	Bassett,	1978).	If	we	take	a	general	statement	of	
this	approach,	across	all	points,	or	quantiles,	in	the	distribution	we	have	the	estimation	
for	the	regression	quantile	as	minimising	the	equation	below:
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The	above	 then	provides	 the	solution	 for	 the	ith	quantile,	where	0<i<1,	allowing	
for	estimation	at	any	given	point	 in	 the	distribution	of	 the	outcome	variable.	 In	 the	
above	Y
i
 is	 the	dependent	variable,	x
i
 is	 the	kx1	vector	of	 independent	variables	and	
b is coefficient vector (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). One particular case of the quantile 
regression	is	the	median	regression,	which	 is	obtained	in	the	above	by	setting	i=0.5.	
Alternative	values	of	i	therefore	provide	us	with	different	quantile	estimates.	Ultimately,	
while	the	OLS	approach	estimates	the	mean	effect	of	 the	explanatory	variable	on	the	
dependent	variable,	 the	quantile	 regression	approach	enables	an	estimation	at	any	
number	of	different	points	in	the	conditional	distribution	of	the	dependent	variable.
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In the application of this technique we were therefore able to specifically estimate the 
impact	of	bargaining	council	membership	and	union	membership	at	particular	points	in	
the	conditional	wage	distribution.	This	allowed	us	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	institutional	
wage	formation	at	different	points	in	the	wage	distribution.	
It	is	also	possible	to	estimate	the	impact	of	the	relevant	variables	on	the	differences	in	
earnings.	 In	order	 to	achieve	this,	 the	quantile	regression	approach	can	be	extended	
to	estimate	a	set	of	 inter-quantile	 regressions,	where	 the	dependent	variable	 is	 the	
difference	between	 the	 two	quantiles	 (See	Bhorat	&	Oosthuizen,	2006).	The	 inter-
quantile	approach	takes	the	following	form:
    iii XYQYQ ''' )()(    	 	 	 	 (3)
where	Q
i
 	and	Q
i’
 refer to the specific quantiles or percentiles for the dependent 
variable,	Y
i  
. The coefficient, (b
i
-b
i’
) therefore represents the influence of the percentile 
difference	in	the	independent	variable	on	the	dispersion	in	the	dependent	variable.22	The	
coefficients indicate if a variable is significant or not and if the variable is significantly 
different	from	zero,	its	sign	indicates	whether	it	increases	or	reduces	the	distribution	in	
wages across the two selected percentiles. In our analysis the coefficients will indicate 
(if significantly different from zero) if membership of a bargaining councils or a union 
increases	or	decreases	the	wage	differential	across	the	measured	percentiles.	
Results	
Earnings	of	formal	sector	employees,	(excluding	the	informal	sector,	domestic	workers	
and	the	self-employed)	were	estimated	for	1995	and	2005.	In	each	case,	earnings	are	
measured	by	the	log	of	the	total	monthly	wages.
In	both	years	the	referent	variables	are:
•	 Race:	African
•	 Gender:	Male
•	 Province:	Gauteng
22	 The	reported	coefficients,	as	will	be	shown,	are	effectively	the	difference	at	the	respective	quantiles	across	the	variables.	
The	variance-covariance	matrix,	however,	of	the	inter-quantile	regressions,	is	derived	through	bootstrapping.
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•	 Occupation:	Elementary	Workers
•	 Industry:	Manufacturing
Bargaining	council	and	union	membership	are	presented	by	three	dummy	variables.	The	
bargaining	council/union	member	dummy	is	one	for	all	employees	who	are	members	of	
both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	and	zero	 for	all	other	 formally	employed.	The	
bargaining	council/non-union	member	dummy	is	one	for	employees	who	are	members	
of	a	bargaining	council	but	do	not	belong	to	a	union,	and	zero	otherwise.	Finally	 the	
union	dummy	 is	simply	one	 for	union	members	and	zero	 for	non-union	members.23	
Standard	controls	for	race,	gender,	education,	location,	industry,	occupation,	experience	
and	hours	worked	per	month	are	 included	 in	 the	equation.	For	2005	only,	 in	order	 to	
capture	 the	effect	of	public	sector	versus	private	sector	employment	and,	 therefore,	
the	 impact	of	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils,	 two	dummies	are	 included	for	 the	
Commercial,	Social	and	Personal	Services	(CSPS)	sector.	This	was	done,	given	that	
88	percent	of	people	who	worked	 in	 the	three	spheres	of	government	and	estimated	
as	belonging	 to	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils	were	coded	as	employees	 in	
that	sector.	Two	separate	dummies	were	therefore	created,	 for	public	sector	workers	
in	the	CSPS	sector	and	for	people	employed	in	the	private	CSPS	sector	respectively.	
This serves as the first specification for the earnings function for 2005. The second 
specification retains a single dummy representing the CSPS sector. In order to capture 
the	 impact	of	 the	private	and	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils	separately,	 two	
dummies	are	included	in	this	earnings	function,	representing	private	sector	bargaining	
council	membership	and	public	sector	bargaining	council	membership	respectively.			
Table	11	presents	 the	earnings	 function	 for	all	 those	 in	 formal	employment	 in	1995.	
Looking at the second last variable first, the coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio (empl_
lambda) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting the presence of sample 
selection	bias,	which	was	corrected	for.	In	other	words,	the	sample	of	earners	was	not	a	
random	selection	drawn	from	the	pool	of	potential	labour	market	participants	in	1995.
Statistically	 significant	 coefficients	 for	 all	 three	 race	 groups	 indicate	 that	African	
workers	 in	 the	 formal	economy	were	 likely	 to	earn	 less	 than	workers	 from	the	other	
race	groups	in	1995,	with	the	differential	particularly	large	when	their	average	earnings	
2	 In	 the	discussion	of	our	 results,	we	 interpret	 the	estimates	of	 the	coefficients	on	 these	dummies	as	 the	bargaining	
council	wage	gap,	bargaining	council/union	wage	gap	or	the	simple	union	wage	gap.	This	means	that	we	report	the	
impact	of	the	coefficient	estimate	as	a	percentage	change	in	the	log	monthly	wage.	We	do	this	because	the	estimates	
of	our	coefficients	are	relatively	small.	For	coefficient	estimates	(of	dummy	variables)	of	larger	magnitudes	the	effect	
on the dependent variable should be calculated as (ее  - 1), with е the coefficient estimate (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980: 
7-75).
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are	compared	to	those	of	White	workers.	Being	female,	as	opposed	to	male,	reduced	
earnings	by	about	23	percent	 for	 those	 in	 formal	employment.	The	education	splines	
show	that	higher	 levels	of	education	were	associated	with	higher	earnings	 in	1995.	
As	expected,	 those	 formally	employed	 in	urban	areas	earned	more	 than	 their	 rural	
counterparts,	by	about	13	percent.	
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Table 11:  Earnings Equation 1995 (Formal Employment)
Dependent Variable: Log of Mean Monthly Earnings Coefficients
Coloured 0.1957*
Asian 0.2601*
White 0.5562*
Female -0.2298*
No education to Incomplete GET (None to Grade 8) 0.0376*
Complete GET (Grade 9 to 11) 0.0966*
Matric (Grade 12) 0.1903*
Diploma 0.1531*
Degree 0.1166*
Urban 0.1319*
Managers 0.7258*
Professionals 0.5368*
Clerks 0.2771*
Service Workers 0.1753*
Skilled Agricultural 0.4733*
Craft and Trade Workers 0.2498*
Operators and Assemblers 0.1702*
Agriculture -0.6970*
Mining -0.0046
Utilities 0.1574*
Construction -0.1486*
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.1667*
Transport 0.0708*
Finance 0.0034
Commercial, Social and Personal Services 0.0207
Private Households -0.7124*
Experience 0.0344*
Experience squared -0.0005*
Log of hours worked per month 0.1331*
Bargaining council/union member 0.0236
Bargaining council/non-union member 0.0694*
Union 0.1959*
Emp_lambda -0.1148*
Constant 5.3735*
Number Observed 24479
F 1066.86*
Adjusted R2 0.6519
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
A	set	of	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equation,	but	are	not	presented	
in Table 11. With the exception of Limpopo, for which the coefficient is statistically 
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insignificant,	 those	 residing	 in	 the	other	provinces	 in	1995	earned	 less	 than	 those	
formally	employed	in	Gauteng.
Belonging	to	any	other	occupation	group	than	an	Elementary	Worker	was	associated	
with	higher	average	earnings.	The	 results	 show	 that	 those	 in	 skilled	occupations	
(Managers	and	Professionals)	enjoyed	 the	 largest	differentials,	 followed	by	Skilled	
Agriculture	and	Fishery	Workers	and	Craft	Workers.	Operators	and	Assemblers	and	
Service	Workers	were	 likely	 to	earn	on	average	17	percent	more	 than	Elementary	
Workers	in	1995.	
Only	 formal	sector	workers	 in	Utilities,	Transport,	Finance	and	Commercial,	Social	&	
Personal	Services	earned	more	than	those	employed	in	the	Manufacturing	sector,	with	
the	largest	differential	for	the	Utilities	sector.	Workers	in	Agriculture,	Construction,	Trade	
and	Private	Households	were	earning	 less	than	workers	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector,	
with	the	differential	of	0.70	particularly	large	for	workers	in	the	Agricultural	sector.
The	positive	and	 significant	 coefficient	 for	 experience	 indicate	 that	 an	additional	
year	of	experience	generated	a	return	 to	earnings	of	about	3,4	percent	 in	1995.	As	
expected the coefficient for experience squared was negative and significant indicating 
diminishing	returns	to	experience.
Of	particular	interest	for	this	analysis	is	the	impact	of	being	a	member	of	a	bargaining	
council	 or	 a	 union	 on	 earnings.	 The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 bargaining	 council/union	
membership dummy is statistically insignificant, implying that in 1995 a formal sector 
worker	who	was	a	member	of	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	did	not	enjoy	
any	wage	premium	as	a	consequence	of	his/her	membership	of	 the	 two	 institutions.	
However,	workers	within	a	bargaining	council	but	not	union	members	did	enjoy	a	wage	
premium relative to those not covered by a wage agreement. The statistically significant 
coefficient of this dummy implies that bargaining council members were likely to earn 
almost	seven	percent	more	than	those	not	covered	by	a	wage	agreement.	Membership	
of	a	union	in	1995	provided	a	much	larger	wage	premium,	with	workers	that	belonged	
to	a	union,	but	not	a	bargaining	council,	enjoying	a	union	wage	premium	of	almost	20	
percent.24		
2	 Past	studies	analysing	the	impact	of	institutional	wage	formation	on	earnings	have	concentrated	mainly	on	estimating	
the	union	wage	gap.	The	results	vary	widely,	partly	as	a	result	of	different	methodologies	and	of	the	samples	being	
limited	by	gender	or	race.	Our	union	wage	gap	for	995	of	almost	20	percent	compares	well	with	the	estimates	from	
Bhorat	and	Leibbrandt	(200:	25).	They	estimated	a	union	wage	gap	of	20	percent	for	African	males	and	2	percent	
for	African	females,	using	the	995	OHS.

Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The Role of Bargaining Councils
Ultimately,	 this	 result	 for	 1995	 suggests	 that	 bargaining	 councils	 impacted	
significantly on an individual’s mean wages only in the absence of union membership. 
Institutionalised	wage	 formation	 in	1995	 therefore	was	characterised	by	a	strong	
union-wage	 effect	 and	 a	 significant	 (albeit	 lower)	 bargaining	 council	 effect.	 The	
latter,	 importantly,	was	only	 true	for	 those	bargaining	council	members	who	were	not	
unionised.		
Table	 12	 presents	 the	 earnings	 function	 for	 the	 formally	 employed	 in	 2005.	 For	
2005, two specifications of the earnings function were estimated. In tems of the first 
specification, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (empl_lambda)	 is	again	negative	
and statistically significant, confirming that there was sample selection bias which was 
corrected	for.
Again, the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the race dummies indicate 
that	African	workers	were	 likely	 to	earn	 less	 than	workers	 from	the	other	 three	race	
groups	 in	2005.	The	differentials	 for	Coloured	and	White	workers	are	slightly	smaller	
than	in	1995,	with	the	differential	for	Asian	workers	larger.	This	suggests	that	by	2005,	
African	workers	in	the	formal	sector	have	seen	the	gap	between	their	earnings	and	that	
of	Coloured	and	White	workers	begin	 to	decrease.	The	average	earnings	of	 females	
remained	less	than	those	of	men,	with	the	differential	slightly	smaller	than	in	1995.
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Table 12:  Earnings Equation 2005 (Formal Employment)
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
The	positive	 returns	 to	education	are	also	again	evident,	with	additional	 years	of	
education	(presented	by	the	education	splines)	 impacting	positively	on	earnings.	The	
greatest	additional	positive	 impact	on	average	earnings	 is	associated	with	Matric	or	a	
degree in 2005. The LFS no longer records information by urban-rural classification, 
but	by	district	and	metropolitan	council.	The	metro	dummy	is	one	for	all	workers	living	
in	metropolitan	municipalities	and	zero	 for	 those	 living	outside	 these	areas	(in	areas	
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run by district municipalities). The positive and significant coefficient for this dummy 
indicates	 that	 in	2005	workers	 living	 in	metropolitan	municipalities	earned	more	than	
those	residing	in	the	district	municipalities.
Not	surprising,	all	occupations	groups	were	associated	with	higher	earnings	relative	to	
Elementary	Workers,	with	large	differentials	for	skilled	workers.	Turning	to	the	sectoral	
dummies, the coefficients for the Transport and the Financial Services sectors are 
not statistically significant. Formal employees in Agriculture, Construction, Wholesale 
&	Retail	Trade,	as	well	as	Private	Households	earned	 less	relative	 to	 formal	sector	
employees	in	Manufacturing.	Workers	in	Mining	and	Utilities,	on	the	other	hand,	earned	
more than those working in Manufacturing. The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient for the public sector CSPS dummy captures the wage premium enjoyed 
by workers in the public sector. The coefficient for the private sector is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that private sector workers in that sector earned less 
that those employed in the Manufacturing sector. The positive and significant coefficient 
for	experience	 indicates	 that	an	additional	year	of	experience	generated	a	return	 to	
earnings of about 2,4 percent in 2005. Again the negative and significant coefficient for 
experience	squared	indicates	diminishing	returns	to	experience.
A	set	of	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equation,	but	are	not	presented	
in	Table	12.	With	 the	exception	of	 the	Western	Cape	 (for	which	 the	coefficient	 is	
statistically insignificant), the results indicated that in 2005 the formally employed living 
in	any	of	 the	other	seven	provinces	earned	 less	 than	 their	counterparts	 living	 in	 the	
referent	province,	Gauteng.			
We	now	 turn	 to	 the	 three	dummies	 that	capture	 the	effect	of	 institutionalised	wage	
setting in South Africa in the first specification. The coefficient for the bargaining council/
non-union member dummy is statistically insignificant, indicating that a formal sector 
worker	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreement	but	not	a	member	of	a	union,	did	
not enjoy a wage premium in 2005. Both the coefficients for the union membership 
dummy	and	the	bargaining	council/union	member	dummy	are	positive	and	statistically	
significant. Union membership on its own is associated with an earnings premium of 
about 17 percent. The coefficient for the bargaining council/union member dummy 
translates	into	a	return	to	earnings	of	almost	16	percent.	
The	aim	of	 including	two	dummies	for	 the	CSPS	sector	was	to	capture	the	 impact	of	
private	sector	and	public	sector	employment	separately.	 In	2005,	almost	95	percent	
of	workers	 in	 the	public	sector	were	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements.	The	
positive and significant coefficient for the CSPS public sector dummy does suggest 
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that	being	a	public	sector	worker	 is	associated	with	an	earnings	premium	relative	 to	
a worker in the Manufacturing sector. It does not, however, sufficiently capture the 
impact	of	public	sector	bargaining	council	membership.	The	above	earnings	equation	
was	estimated	with	 the	 two	CSPS	dummies	 replaced	by	a	single	sectoral	dummy,	
and	 the	dummies	 related	 to	union	and	bargaining	council	membership	 replaced	by	
two	dummies,	 for	private	sector	bargaining	council	membership	and	public	sector	
bargaining	council	membership	respectively.	Table	12	also	shows	 the	results	of	 this	
second	specification.	The	magnitudes	and	signs	of	 the	coefficients	 for	 the	control	
variables are almost identical to those in the first specification. The estimated coefficient 
for the CSPS dummy, however, is negative and significant, which was expected given 
the	 results	 from	specification	 (1).	This	 implies	 that	 the	average	earnings	of	CSPS	
workers lagged those found within Manufacturing. The coefficient for the private sector 
bargaining	dummy	 is	 insignificant,	again	 implying	 that	 if	you	worked	 in	 the	private	
sector,	membership	of	a	bargaining	council	did	not	award	you	a	wage	premium	in	2005.	
Both the public sector dummy and the union dummy are positive and significant. This 
means	that	public	sector	workers	did	enjoy	a	wage	premium	due	to	their	membership	of	
the	public	sector	bargaining	councils,	of	about	28	percent.	The	union	wage	premium	for	
2005	according	to	this	estimation	is	about	23	percent.	
Figure	1	presents	a	summary	of	 the	wage	premia	associated	with	 institutional	wage	
formation	 in	1995	and	2005.	 It	only	shows	 the	coefficients	which	were	statistically	
significant. The union wage gap is significant in 1995 and for both specifications in 
2005, with the size of the coefficient varying from 17 percent to 23 percent. This implies 
that	 in	both	years,	workers	enjoyed	a	wage	premium	associated	with	 their	 union	
membership,	irrespective	of	bargaining	council	membership.		
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Figure 1:  Mean Bargaining Council and Union Wage Premia, 1995 and 2005
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Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
In	1995,	workers	not	belonging	to	a	union	but	part	of	a	bargaining	council,	enjoyed	a	
wage	premium	of	about	seven	percent.	In	that	year,	union	membership	in	combination	
with membership with a bargaining council did not yield any significant wage premium. A 
decade	later,	however,	the	bargaining	council	system	did	not	offer	individuals	who	were	
not	unionised	any	premium.	 In	contrast,	workers	part	of	both	a	union	and	bargaining	
council	enjoyed	a	wage	premium	of	more	 than	15	percent	 in	2005.	This	 result	was	
primarily	driven	by	the	fact	that	all	non-managers	in	the	public	sector	now	belonged	to	
the	public	service	bargaining	councils,	with	a	large	share	of	these	individuals	unionised.	
The	impact	of	this	new	public	service	bargaining	council	system	is	illustrated	even	more	
clearly by the results from the second specification. While system membership of a 
private	sector	bargaining	council	did	not	yield	any	premium,	membership	of	the	public	
sector	bargaining	councils	was	associated	with	a	wage	premium	of	28	percent.	
The results from our multivariate analysis confirm the tentative conclusions from our 
descriptive	overview.	Firstly,	 the	wage	premium	associated	with	union	membership	
remained	 strong	 between	 1995	 and	 2005.	 Indeed,	 the	 estimates	 re-affirm	many	
previous	 union-wage	 premia	 derived	 in	 older	 datasets.	 They,	 therefore,	 confirm	
the	strong	effect	union	membership	continues	 to	have	 in	shaping	and	determining	
mean	wages	 in	the	South	African	 labour	market.	 In	 turn,	however,	our	more	nuanced	
representation	of	 institutionalised	wage	 formation	suggests	 the	Bargaining	Council	
membership	was	also	critical.	In	particular,	it	is	evident	that	public	employees	who	were	
members of PSBC ensured a high and significant return to their earnings in 2005. The 
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importance	of	both	unions	and	bargain	councils	 in	determining	wages	 is	clear	when	
we	consider	 that	a	 joint	premium	of	as	high	as	51	percent	may	be	present	 through	
these	institutions	of	 the	 labour	market,	Finally,	 though,	this	strength	 in	unions	and	the	
PSBC,	should	not	mask	the	fact	that	the	private	sector	bargaining	council	system	has	in	
contrast	been	in	marked	decline	over	the	1995-2005	period.
Results	from	Quantile	Regressions
Table	13	compares	the	OLS	(mean	estimate)	results	with	 those	at	 the	10th,	25th,	50th,	
75th	and	 the	90th	percentile	of	 the	 log	wage	distribution	 in	1995.	This	allows	us	 to	
evaluate	 the	 impact	of	 the	explanatory	variables	on	 the	earnings	of	 formal	sector	
workers	at	these	points	of	the	log	wage	distribution.	
At all five points (and at the mean) of the earnings distribution being African, resulted 
in	 lower	earnings	 relative	 to	 the	other	 three	 race	groups.	The	magnitudes	of	 the	
coefficients vary slightly across the quantiles, but at all points Whites enjoyed the largest 
wage	differential,	 followed	by	Asians	and	Coloureds.	The	negative	and	statistically	
significant coefficients for the female dummy suggest gender discrimination across the 
wage distribution. The magnitude of these coefficients increases across the distribution, 
implying	that	the	earnings	differential	between	males	and	females	 increased	at	higher	
points	in	the	wage	distribution	in	1995.
Positive	returns	to	education	are	evident	at	all	percentiles	under	consideration.	Living	
in	an	urban	area	as	opposed	 to	a	 rural	area	was	associated	with	a	higher	 level	of	
earnings,	 but	 became	 less	 important	 as	we	moved	 towards	 the	 top	 of	 the	wage	
distribution.			
Again,	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equations,	but	are	not	shown	here.	
Workers	living	in	provinces	other	than	Gauteng	generally	earned	less	across	the	wage	
distribution. There are a few exceptions, with the coefficient of the dummy for KwaZulu-
Natal not significant at the 90th percentile, while the coefficients for the Limpopo dummy 
are insignificant at the 25th	and	the	50th percentile. For Limpopo, the coefficients at the 
75th	and	the	90th percentile are positive and significant; implying that these workers at 
the	top	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	more	than	their	colleagues	in	Gauteng.
For Managers, Professionals and Clerks the coefficients are positive and significant 
across	 the	wage	distribution,	with	 the	differentials	 remaining	relatively	stable	across	
the	distribution.	Skilled	Agricultural	workers	enjoyed	a	steady	 increase	 in	 their	wages	
relative	 to	Elementary	Workers	 from	 the	25th	percentile	onwards.	Craft	and	Trade	
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workers	experienced	a	similar	trend,	with	workers	at	the	95th percentile benefiting from 
a	much	larger	differential	than	those	at	the	bottom.	Operators	and	Assemblers	did	not	
see	much	variation	across	the	different	points	of	the	wage	distribution,	but	earned	more	
than	Elementary	workers	at	every	percentile	under	consideration.	Earnings	by	sector	
varied	substantially	relative	to	the	referent	sector,	Manufacturing,	as	well	as	across	the	
distributions in each sector. The coefficients for experience and experience squared 
are very similar to the coefficients estimated at the mean at the different points of the 
distribution.
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Table 13:  Earnings Functions Estimates, 1995
Quantile ( ) =Dependent Variable:
Log of monthly earnings OLS 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Coloured 0.196* 0.161* 0.173* 0.149* 0.185* 0.215*
Asian 0.260* 0.272* 0.252* 0.224* 0.254* 0.282*
White 0.556* 0.518* 0.527* 0.535* 0.579* 0.573*
Female -0.230* -0.165* -0.182* -0.205* -0.233* -0.234*
None to Incomplete GET
(None - Grade 8) 0.038* 0.047* 0.046* 0.035* 0.033* 0.031*
Complete GET
(Grade 9 - 11) 0.097* 0.084* 0.081* 0.089* 0.100* 0.100*
Matric (Grade 12) 0.190* 0.199* 0.178* 0.175* 0.174* 0.194*
Diploma 0.153* 0.089** 0.121* 0.168* 0.169* 0.152*
Degree 0.117* 0.090* 0.116* 0.115* 0.140* 0.196*
Urban 0.132* 0.169* 0.146* 0.131* 0.108* 0.086*
Managers 0.726* 0.654* 0.704* 0.705* 0.771* 0.749*
Professionals 0.537* 0.546* 0.564* 0.525* 0.557* 0.554*
Clerks 0.277* 0.305* 0.299* 0.279* 0.267* 0.266*
Service Workers 0.175* 0.091* 0.139* 0.187* 0.244* 0.281*
Skilled Agricultural 0.473* -0.027 0.385* 0.574* 0.679* 0.705*
Craft & Trade Workers 0.250* 0.216* 0.255* 0.252* 0.289* 0.362*
Operators & Assemblers 0.170* 0.190* 0.171* 0.159* 0.165* 0.196*
Agriculture -0.697* -0.661* -0.751* -0.771* -0.752* -0.654*
Mining -0.005 -0.034 -0.046 -0.038 -0.073* -0.038
Utilities 0.157* 0.157** 0.206* 0.157* 0.089 0.115
Construction -0.149* -0.170* -0.196* -0.188* -0.155* -0.139*
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.167* -0.133* -0.164* -0.188* -0.201* -0.173*
Transport 0.071* 0.173* 0.101* 0.030 0.004 -0.002
Finance 0.003 0.062 0.017 -0.013 -0.037 -0.023
CSPS 0.021 0.091* 0.035 0.000 -0.049** -0.068*
Private Households -0.712* -0.752* -0.827* -0.785* -0.697* -0.551*
Experience 0.034* 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 0.033* 0.036*
Experience squared -0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Log of hours (per month) 0.133* 0.243* 0.155* 0.093* 0.079* 0.049**
BC/union member 0.024 0.061 0.030 0.027 -0.022 -0.016
BC/non-union member 0.069* 0.061 0.043** 0.055* 0.059* 0.067**
Union 0.196* 0.301* 0.240* 0.166* 0.144* 0.091*
Emp_lambda -0.115* -0.320* -0.269* -0.208* -0.035 -0.037
Constant 5.374* 4.179* 5.036* 5.762* 6.032* 6.419*
Number Observed 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.4322 0.4543 0.4401 0.4273 0.4026
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
Turning to the coefficients of the dummies that capture bargaining council and union 
membership, the coefficient of the dummy presenting bargaining council membership 
together	with	union	membership	 remain	 insignificant	across	 the	distribution.	This	
means	 that	membership	of	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	at	 the	same	time	
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did	not	have	any	 impact	on	a	 formally	employed	worker’s	earnings	at	any	point	of	
the	wage	distribution	 in	1995.	The	coefficient	of	 the	dummy	capturing	bargaining	
council membership without union membership is not statistically significant at the 
10th percentile. It is, however significant at the 25th,	50th,	75th	and	90th	percentile,	with	
the	magnitude	 increasing	 towards	 the	 top	of	 the	distribution.	This	 implies	 that	at	 the	
very bottom of the wage distribution, workers did not benefit from being a member 
of	a	bargaining	council	 in	1995.	Thus,	 the	bargaining	council	premium	for	non-union	
members is significant for most of the wage distribution and, notably, remains so even 
at	the	90th percentile. Hence, while the OLS estimates confirmed a significant bargaining 
council/non-union	 impact	at	 the	mean,	we	suggest	here	 that	 this	 impact	holds	 true	
across	the	entire	wage	distribution,	barring	those	 individuals	at	 the	10th	percentile.	 In	
addition, the coefficients of the union membership dummy are positive and significant 
across the entire distribution. The fact that the size of the coefficients decline across the 
wage	distribution	suggests,	as	would	be	expected,	that	the	magnitude	of	the	premia	in	
1995	was	highest	amongst	those	workers	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	
Given the focus of the paper, the derived coefficients (if statistically significant) for the 
bargaining	council/union,	bargaining	council/non-union	and	union	variables	at	different	
points	 in	 the	wage	distribution	 in	1995	are	shown	 in	Figure	2.	 In	addition,	we	also	
display the mean OLS estimates. In all cases these OLS coefficients are presented 
by the relevant horizontal lines. The coefficient for bargaining council membership in 
combination with union membership is insignificant at all points of the wage distribution, 
and	at	the	mean	as	discussed	above	and	are	therefore	not	included	in	Figure	2.	
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Figure 2:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by  
   Percentiles, 1995
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Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
The coefficient on bargaining council-nonunion is significant at the mean, but not at the 
very	bottom	(5th	and	10th	percentile)	or	at	the	very	top	(95th	percentile)	of	the	distribution.	
This	 implies	that	belonging	to	a	bargaining	council	did	not	have	any	 impact	on	these	
workers’	earnings.	The	coefficients	are	significant	either	at	 the	one	percent	or	 the	
five percent level for the remaining points of the wage distribution. Note, however, 
that	 this	bargaining	council	premium	is	relatively	stable	across	the	entire	distribution,	
varying	between	four	percent	and	eight	percent	suggesting,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 impact	
of	bargaining	council	membership	was	distribution-neutral.
The	 coefficients	 for	 the	dummy	 representing	union	membership	are	positive	and	
statistically significant across the distribution with the exception of the 95th	percentile.	
The estimated coefficients indicate, of course, that union members earned more that 
their	non-unionised	counterparts.	In	addition,	the	downward	trend	implies	that	in	1995,	
relatively	 low-earning	(and	disproportionately	unskilled)	workers	at	 the	bottom	end	of	
the distribution benefited more from belonging to a union than better-earning, higher 
skilled	workers.
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Table	14	compares	 the	OLS	 results	with	 those	at	 the	10th,	25th,	50th,	75th	and	 the	
90th	percentile	of	 the	 log	wage	distribution	 in	2005.	The	 three	dummies	capturing	
institutionalised	 wage	 formation	 are	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	 member;	
public	sector	bargaining	council	member	and	union	member,	which	 is	our	preferred	
specification (2) from Table 12. The results are very similar to those estimated in 1995. 
One	main	difference	is	that	the	White	wage	premium	has	declined	at	that	bottom	of	the	
distribution,	with	Asians	actually	earning	more	than	Whites	relative	 to	Africans	at	 the	
10th	percentile.	Again,	females	were	likely	to	earn	less	than	their	male	colleagues,	but	in	
comparison	with	1995	the	differential	has	declined	at	the	very	top	of	the	distribution.		
Higher	earnings	were,	as	expected,	associated	with	a	higher	level	of	education	across	
the	wage	distribution	 in	2005.	Living	 in	a	metro	area	as	opposed	to	a	non-metro	area	
was	associated	with	higher	earnings.	This	premium	declined	over	the	distribution	and	
is not significant at the very top of the distribution. The results by provinces are not 
displayed	 in	Table14.	With	 the	exception	of	 the	Western	Cape	at	 the	10th,	25th,	50th	
and	90th	percentile,	and	the	Eastern	Cape	at	 the	10th percentile, all coefficients for all 
provinces are negative and statistically significant, meaning that workers living outside 
Gauteng	earned	less	than	those	that	resided	in	the	province.
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Table 14:  Earnings Function Estimates, 2005
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
As in 1995, the coefficients for the Managers, Professionals and Clerks are positive 
and significant across the distribution, with the magnitudes relatively stable. This means 
that,	as	expected,	workers	 in	 these	occupation	groups	earned	more	that	Elementary	
Workers across the distribution. The coefficient of the dummy for Service Workers only 
becomes significant at the 50th percentile. The positive coefficients at the 50th,	75th	and	
90th	percentile	mean	that	Service	Workers	in	the	top	half	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	
more than Elementary Workers. The coefficient for agricultural workers is not significant 
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at	 the	10th percentile. It becomes significant at the 25th	percentile	and	the	magnitude	
increases	across	the	distribution.	With	the	exception	of	Craft	and	Trade	workers	at	the	
10th	percentile,	workers	 from	this	occupation	group	and	Operators	and	Assemblers	
across	the	distribution	earned	more	than	Elementary	Workers	in	2005.	
The	 coefficients	 of	 the	 dummies	 that	 capture	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	
membership are statistically insignificant at all estimated percentiles of the distribution. 
In	 other	 words,	 workers	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 did	 not	 enjoy	 any	 wage	 premium	
associated	with	membership	 of	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	 in	 2005,	 thus,	
reinforcing the OLS estimate. The coefficients for the public sector bargaining council 
membership are positive and significant across the wage distribution. The size of the 
coefficient increases slightly from the 10th	to	the	25th	percentile,	before	declining	towards	
the	top	of	 the	distribution.	Again,	 this	suggests	 that	workers	 in	 the	bottom	half	of	 the	
distribution benefited more from being covered by public sector bargaining council wage 
agreements. The coefficients of the union membership dummy are also again positive 
and significant across the wage distribution. As expected the magnitude of coefficients 
declines	across	 the	distribution,	capturing	 the	 relatively	higher	union	wage	premia	
enjoyed	by	workers	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	distribution.	The	result	at	the	10th	percentile	
is	very	 interesting,	with	the	union	wage	premium	in	fact	exceeding	the	wage	premium	
associated	with	public	sector	bargaining	council	membership.		
Figure	3	graphically	presents	the	impact	of	institutional	wage	formation	across	the	wage	
distribution	in	2005.	
The coefficient for the private bargaining council dummy is statistically insignificant at 
the	mean	as	well	as	across	the	wage	distribution,	with	the	notable	exception	(although	
not	shown	in	Table	14)	of	the	5th percentile. The fact that the coefficient is significant at 
the	5th percentile implies that the only workers in the private sector who benefited from 
belonging	 to	a	bargaining	council	 in	2005	were	 those	at	 the	very	bottom	end	of	 the	
distribution.	Closer	 inspection	of	 the	data	reveals	 these	workers	were	predominantly	
Operators	and	Assemblers	in	the	Clothing	sector,	semi-	and	unskilled	workers	belonging	
to	the	Metal	and	Engineering	Bargaining	Council	as	well	as	semi-	and	unskilled	workers	
in	the	motor	industry.
The	situation	looks	completely	different	for	public	sector	employees	who	were	members	
of the nascent public service bargaining councils. The coefficient for the dummy is, thus, 
positive and significant at the mean as well as at all points in the earnings distribution. 
In	2005,	membership	of	a	public	service	bargaining	council	offered	a	wage	premium	of	
between	18	percent	and	34	percent.	This	public	service	bargaining	council	wage	gap	
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increased	from	the	5th	percentile	 to	 the	35th	percentile,	before	declining	to	 the	 lowest	
point	at	the	95th	percentile	(apart	from	a	spike	around	the	60th	and	65th	percentile).
Figure 3:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by  
   Percentiles, 2005
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Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Similar	 to	 the	previous	graph,	 the	coefficient	 for	 the	union	membership	dummy	 is	
positive and statistically significant at the mean as well as across the distribution. The 
union	wage	premium	declined	across	 the	wage	distribution;	with	 the	wage	gap	 for	
unionised	workers	at	the	5th	percentile	almost	double	the	gap	for	the	unionised	workers	
at	the	very	top	of	the	distribution.
It	 is	 important	 to	note	 in	1995,	the	values	of	 the	union	wage	premia	were	higher	than	
the	bargaining	council	wage	premia	at	all	points	of	 the	wage	distribution.	This	 is	no	
longer	the	case	in	2005,	as	illustrated	above.	At	the	20th,	25th,	35th	and	40th	percentiles	
as	well	as	from	the	60th	percentile	onwards,	the	public	sector	bargaining	council	wage	
premia	 is,	 in	 fact,	higher	 than	 the	union	wage	premia.	This	represents	an	additional	
feature	of	our	 institutionalised	 industrial	system,	namely	 that	not	only	has	there	been	
the	establishment	of	a	highly	organised	public	sector	bargaining	council	system,	 this	
new	labour	market	 institution	has	also	crucially,	been	able	 to	extract	returns	for	 their	
workers	as	high,	or	in	some	cases	higher,	than	those	who	are	members	of	a	union.	This	
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is	distinctly	a	new	feature	into	our	understanding	of	wage	levels,	wage	formation	of	the	
role	of	 labour	markets	in	the	former.	The	rise	of	the	PSBC	system	must,	therefore,	be	
noted	as	a	distinctly	new	development	in	our	understanding	of	the	post-apartheid labour	
market	in	South	Africa.	
Determinants	of	Wage	Inequality:	Inter-Quantile	Regression	Estimates
For	both	years,	we	estimated	the	impact	of	the	explanatory	variables	on	the	differences	
in earnings, specifically between the 90th	and	the	10th	percentiles,	the	90th	and	the	50th	
percentiles and finally the 50th	and	 the	10th	percentiles,	based	on	equation	(3).	The	
results	for	1995	can	be	found	in	Appendix	I,	with	those	for	2005	in	Appendix	J.			
We	are	particularly	 interested	 in	 the	 impact	of	wage	setting	 in	bargaining	councils	
and	unions	on	the	earnings	inequality.	This	may	provide	some	evidence	on	the	extent	
to	which	 institutional	wage	 formation	contributes	 to	 the	 increase	or	decline	 in	wage	
inequality. The coefficients for the dummy representing membership of a bargaining 
council only are insignificant for all three inter-quantile estimates in 1995. This means 
that	 in	1995	wage	agreements	negotiated	 in	bargaining	councils	did	not	contribute	
to	 altering	earnings	 inequality	 between	 the	90th	-10th,	 90th	-	 50th	 and	 the	50th	-10th	
percentiles. This means that there is no significant difference in the wage premium 
associated	with	a	non-union	bargaining	council	member	at	 the	chosen	 interquantiles.	
This is consistent with the fact that at the quantiles, the coefficients did not vary much 
from	each	other	and	from	the	mean.	
The coefficient for the dummy capturing bargaining council – union membership is 
significant (at the five percent level) only for the 90th	-10th	percentile	difference.	This	
result is interesting because the coefficient was insignificant at the mean (as estimated 
by	the	OLS	regression)	and	at	all	points	of	 the	wage	distribution.	 It	does	suggest	that	
bargaining	council	membership	 in	 tandem	with	union	membership	may	have	served	
to	narrow	the	wage	gap	between	the	workers	at	the	very	bottom	and	at	the	top	of	the	
distribution.	
The	union	coefficient	 is	significant	at	 the	one	percent	 level	 for	all	 three	percentile	
differentials.	The	negative	coefficient	 implies	 that	 in	1995,	membership	of	a	union	
reduced	wage	 inequality	 between	 the	 90th	 and	 10th	 percentile,	 the	 90th	 and	 50th	
percentile	as	well	as	 the	50th	and	10th	percentile.	The	 impact	was	 largest	 for	 the	50th	
to	10th	percentile,	 implying	 that	union	membership	served	mostly	 to	 reduce	wage	
inequality	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	The	results,	though,	reinforce	the	
importance	of	union	membership	to	not	only	increase	wage	premia	to	workers,	but	also	
as	a	contribution	to	decreasing	wage	inequality.	
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In 2005, the coefficient for union membership is again significant (at the five percent 
level) for all three percentile differentials. The coefficient is largest for the 50th	-	10th	
percentile,	again	showing	that	 the	reduction	 in	overall	wage	 inequality	was	driven	by	
the	reduction	 in	wage	 inequality	 in	 the	bottom	half	of	 the	distribution.	The	dummies	
representing	membership	of	a	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	council	were	both	
statistically significant only for the 90th	-	50th	percentile	difference.	This	means	 that	
membership	of	any	bargaining	council	decreased	wage	inequality	in	the	top	half	of	the	
wage	distribution.			
Ultimately	then,	in	both	years	union	membership	not	only	awarded	wage	premia	across	
the	wage	distribution,	 it	also	served	to	reduce	wage	 inequality	and	particularly	so	 in	
the	bottom	half	of	 the	wage	distribution.	 In	1995,	 (private	sector)	bargaining	council	
membership	awarded	a	relatively	stable	premium	to	all	wage	earners,	with	no	 impact	
on	wage	 inequality.	 In	2005,	only	membership	of	a	public	sector	bargaining	council	
awarded a wage premium, with no wage benefits associated with being a member of a 
private	sector	bargaining	council.	Interestingly,	both	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	
council	membership	served	to	reduce	inequality	in	the	top	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	
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 6. Conclusion
The	main	objective	of	this	paper	was	to	estimate	the	wage	premium	(if	any)	associated	
with	industrial	or	bargaining	council	membership	in	the	South	African	labour	market.	As	
this	was	done	for	both	1995	and	2005,	it	also	enabled	us	to	comment	on	the	changing	
patterns	of	institutionalised	wage	formation	in	the	post-apartheid	South	Africa.				
The	descriptive	overview	showed	 that	only	about	15	percent	of	 formally	employed	
workers were members of bargaining councils in 1995. Although, this figure had doubled 
to	32	percent	 in	2005,	 this	still	meant	 that	 less	than	a	third	of	 the	formally	employed	
were	covered	by	bargaining	councils.	Closer	 inspection	of	 the	 increase	 in	bargaining	
council	membership	between	1995	and	2005	 revealed	 that	 is	was	almost	entirely	
driven	by	 the	 rapid	 rise	 in	 the	bargaining	council	system	 for	 the	public	sector.	The	
establishment	of	 the	Private	Sector	Co-ordinating	Bargaining	Council	(PSCBC)	meant	
that	all	non-managers	(and	even	some	levels	of	management)	in	the	public	sector	were	
covered	by	wage	agreements	concluded	in	the	PSCBC.	In	the	private	sector,	however,	
bargaining	councils	have	at	best	stagnated	and	at	worse	declined	between	1995	and	
2005.	Despite	aggregate	employment	growth	 in	sectors	such	as	Construction	and	
Trade,	bargaining	council	membership	has	not	expanded	accordingly.	The	only	notable	
growth	 in	bargaining	council	coverage	was	 in	 the	State	Owned	Enterprise-related	
sectors.	Overall,	 the	number	of	private	sector	workers	covered	by	bargaining	council	
agreements	remained	relatively	stable	at	around	one	million.	Simply	put,	bargaining	
council membership in the first decade of democracy is characterised by an erosion of 
private	sector	bargaining	council	membership	on	the	one	hand	and	the	rapid	rise	of	this	
system	of	bargaining	in	the	public	sector.
At	 first	 glance,	 there	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 any	 significant	 remunerative	
advantage	associated	with	bargaining	council	membership	 in	either	1995	or	2005.	
Closer	 inspection	 of	 the	mean	earnings	 of	 bargaining	 council	members	 in	 2005,	
however, revealed significant premia associated with membership of the PSCBC. At the 
aggregate	 level,	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	not	only	earned	more	than	
the	private	sector	bargaining	council	members,	but	also	on	average	more	than	workers	
outside	the	bargaining	council	system.	This	trend	was	observed	for	males	and	females,	
African	and	Coloured	workers,	as	well	as	when	controlling	for	occupations.	
Our	multivariate	analysis,	 in	 turn,	allowed	us	 to	 isolate	 the	specific	 impact	of	 the	
membership	of	a	bargaining	council,	union	or	both	on	earnings.	
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The results from this analysis confirmed the tentative conclusions from the descriptive 
overview.	Hence,	 in	1995,	workers	 in	 the	bargaining	council-nonunion	cohort	only	
enjoyed	a	small	wage	premium	 relative	 to	workers	who	were	not	covered	by	any	
institutional	wage	agreement.	Workers	 in	 the	union-bargaining	council	cohort	did	not	
enjoy any significant benefit in terms of average earnings. The establishment of the 
PSCBC, however, resulted in significant wage premia being associated with public 
sector	 bargaining	 council	membership	 in	2005.	The	decline	of	 the	private	 sector	
bargaining	council	system,	 in	 turn,	 resulted	 in	 the	membership	of	 these	councils	not	
offering	any	wage	premium	to	 their	members	who	were	not	unionised	–	a	contrast	
from	a	decade	earlier.	Workers	who	belonged	to	both	a	union	and	bargaining	council	
in	2005	did,	however,	enjoy	a	wage	premia.	The	wage	premium	associated	with	union	
membership,	however,	remains	very	strong	between	1995	and	2005.	
We	also	estimated	the	impact	of	bargaining	council	and	union	membership	at	different	
points	of	 the	wage	distributions	as	well	as	 their	 impact	on	differences	 in	earnings.	 In	
1995	and	2005,	union	membership	not	only	awarded	wage	premia	across	 the	wage	
distribution,	 it	also	served	to	reduced	wage	 inequality	(by	reducing	the	differences	 in	
earnings)	and	particularly	so	at	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	Private	sector	
bargaining	council	membership	awarded	a	relatively	stable	premium	to	all	wage	earners	
in	1995,	with	no	impact	on	wage	inequality.	In	2005,	only	membership	of	a	public	sector	
bargaining council awarded a wage premium, with no wage benefits associated with 
being	a	member	of	a	private	sector	bargaining	council.	 Interestingly,	both	private	and	
public	sector	bargaining	council	membership	served	to	reduce	inequality	in	the	top	half	
of	the	wage	distribution	in	2005.	
The	above,	 therefore,	has	attempted	a	detailed	overview	of	 the	nature	of	 the	wage	
formation	and	determination	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	 It	 is	clear	 that,	while	
the	role	of	 trade	unions	 is	made	plain	and	 is	evident	–	 the	often	under-appreciated	
importance	of	bargaining	councils	 in	this	arena	has	been	analysed	in	detail.	 Indeed,	it	
could	be	argued	that	any	debate	and	the	regulatory	regime	in	South	Africa	should	not	
and	cannot	ignore	the	centrality	of	bargaining	councils	to	resolving	and	understanding	
many	of	these	vexed	issues.
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 Appendix A:  List of Industrial Councils - 1995
Industrial	Council	for	the	Cinematograph	and	Theatre	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Diamond	Cutting	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Iron,	Steel,	Engineering	and	Metallurgical	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Leather	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Motor	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Textile	Manufacturing	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(East	London)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Eastern	Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Kimberley)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Kroonstad)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(PMB	and	Northern	Areas)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Port	Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Western	Province)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	and	Monumental	Masonry	Industry	(Bloemfontein)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Building	and	Monumental	Masonry	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Clothing	Industry	(Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Clothing	Industry	(Eastern	Province)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Clothing	Industry	(Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Clothing	Industry	(Orange	Free	State	and	Northern	Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Knitting	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Electrical	Contracting	and	Servicing	Industry	(Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Electrical	Contracting	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Electrical	Industry	(East	London)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Electrical	Industry	–	Electrical	Contracting	Section	(Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(Border)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(Eastern	Cape	Province)
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Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(Orange	Free	State)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(South	Western	Districts)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	(Western	Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Furniture	and	Bedding	Manufacturing	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	Trade	(Border)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	Trade	(Cape	Peninsula)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	Trade	(Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressings	Trade	(Pretoria)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	Trade	(Port	Elizabeth)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	Trade	(Southern	and	Western	Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Liquor	and	Catering	Trade	(Cape)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Liquor	and	Catering	Trade	(South	Coast,	Natal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Liquor,	Catering	and	Accommodation	Trade	(Border)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Motor	Transport	Undertaking	(Goods)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Grain	Co-operative	Trade
Industrial	Council	for	the	Contract	Cleaning	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Canvas	and	Ropemaking	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Canvas	Goods	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Chemical	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Commercial	Distributive	Trade
Industrial	Council	for	the	Jewellery	and	Precious	Metal	Industry
Industrial	Council	for	the	Meat	Trade	(Wholesale	&	Retail	–	East	London)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Millinery	Industry	(Cape)
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Industrial	Council	for	the	Millinery	Industry	(Transvaal)
Industrial	Council	for	the	New	Tyre	Manufacturing	Industry	
Industrial	Council	for	the	Passenger	Transportation	Trade
Industrial	Council	for	the	Retail	Meat	Trade	(Witwatersrand)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Retail	Meat	Trade	(Pretoria)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Road	Passenger	Transport	Industry	(PE)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Tearoom,	Restaurant,	and	Catering	Trade	(Pretoria)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Tearoom,	Restaurant	and	Catering	Trade	(Witwatersrand)
Industrial	Council	for	the	Worsted	Textile	Manufacturing	Industry
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 Appendix B:  List of Bargaining Councils - 2005
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Fishing	Industry
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Canvas	Good	Industry	(Witwatersrand	and	Pretoria)
Bargaining	Council	For	The	Canvas	&	Ropeworking	Industry	(Cape)
National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Chemical	Industry
National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Clothing	Manufacturing	Industry	
Diamond	Cutting	Industry	of	SA	Bargaining	Council
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	BC	(EC)
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	BC	(FS)
Furniture Manufacturing Industry BC (KZN)
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	BC	(South	Western	Districts)
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry		BC	(WC)
Furniture	Industry	Bargaining	Council	(Northern	Region)
Grain	Cooperative	Industry	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
Jewellery	and	Precious	Metal	Industry	BC	(Cape)
National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Leather	Industry
Metal	and	Engineering	Industries	Bargaining	Council	
Bargaining	Council	for	the	New	Tyre	Manufacturing	Industry	
National Bargaining Council for the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry
National	Textile	Bargaining	Council
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Boland)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Southern	&	Eastern	Cape)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Cape	of	Good	Hope)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Bloemfontein)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Building	Industry	(Kimberley)
National	Bargaining	Council		for	the	Electrical	Industry
Commercial	Distributive	Trade	Bargaining	Council	Kimberley
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Bargaining	Council	for	the	Meat	Trade,	Gauteng
Motor	Industry	Bargaining	Council
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Tearoom,	Restaurant	and	Catering	Trade	Pretoria
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Restaurant,	Catering	and	Allied	Trades	
Motor	Ferry	Industry	Bargaining	Council	of	SA	
National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Road	Freight	Industry
South	African	Road	Passenger	Bargaining	Council
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Contract	Cleaning	Industry	(Natal)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Entertainment	Industry	of	SA
Hairdressing	and	Cosmetology	Services	Bargaining	Council	(Semi	-National)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Hairdressing	and	Cosmetology	Services	(Pretoria)
Hairdressing	Trade	Bargaining	Council(Cape	Peninsula)
Hairdressing and Cosmetology Bargaining Council (KZN)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Cape)
Bargaining Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (KZN)
Transnet	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
Public	Service	Coordinating	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
General	Public	Service	Sector	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
Public	Health	and	Welfare	Sectoral	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
Safety	and	Security	Sectoral	Bargaining	Council	(Nat)
Education	Labour	Relations	Council	(National)
South	African	Local	Government	Bargaining	Council
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 C:  Technical Notes:  Creation of IC Coverage for 1995
Coverage	was	constructed	using	the	Industrial	Council	Digest	and	the	OHS.	Some	of	
the	assumptions	are	noted	below:
Areas	/	Districts
The Digest identified areas which were covered in 1992. Some provinces / areas were 
since	renamed.	The	following	are	some	of	the	districts	/	areas	used	to	match	the	two.	
The	Witwatersrand	was	assumed	to	be	what	is	now	called	the	Gauteng	province.	
Cape	Peninsula	was	assumed	to	be	the	following	districts:
Bellville
Goodwood
Cape	Town
Kuilsrivier
Mitchells	Plain
Somerset	West
Strand
Wynberg
The	Boland	included	the	following	districts:
Ceres
Hopefield
Montagu
Mooreesberg
Piketberg
Robertson
Swellendam
Tulbagh
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Vredenberg
Worcestor
Paarl
Stellenbosch
Wellington
The	Transvaal	includes	what	is	now	called	the	North-West,	Gauteng,	Mpumalanga,	and	
Northern	Province.
Agreements
The	Grain	Co-operative	was	only	registered	in	1990,	but	it	had	unpublished	agreements.	
The	Contract	Cleaning	Industry	was	registered	 in	April	1992.	These	were	 included	 in	
the	analysis,	with	the	assumption	that	they	had	agreements	by	1995.	
Councils
•	 Since	the	industry	and	occupation	codes	for	clothing	and	textiles	are	the	same,	
in	practice	they	actually	cover	the	same	workers.	
•	 Where	different	 industrial	councils	existed	for	different	areas,	 the	workers	were	
aggregated	into	a	single	‘council’.	This	is	true	for	the	building,	clothing,	electrical,	
furniture,	hairdressing,	 laundry	cleaning	and	dyeing,	and	 liquor	and	catering	
industrial	 councils.	The	millinery	 as	well	 as	worsted	 textile	manufacturing	
industrial	councils	were	included	under	textiles.	
Scope
The	scope	from	the	Digest	was	used	to	 identify	occupations	and	sectors.	These	were	
not	explicitly	stated,	therefore	there	could	be	a	degree	of	mismatch.	
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 Appendix D:  Technical Notes:  Creation of BC Coverage 2005
Fishing	Industry	Bargaining	Council
•	 Wages	of	skipper	 (fisherman)	not	prescribed	 in	 the	BC	Agreement	and	 this	
occupation	group	is	therefore	not	included	in	the	estimated	coverage
•	 Only	91	workers	estimated	to	be	covered	by	the	BC	agreement	in	the	2005	LFS,	
which is a significant underestimation
Bargaining	Councils	for	the	Canvas	Goods	Industry
•	 No	information	could	be	obtained	on	the	Cape	Canvas	Goods	&	Ropeworking	
Industry	Bargaining	Council	and	it	was	therefore	not	included	in	the	analysis
•	 Matching	 the	 information	 from	 the	Government	Gazette	Notice	on	 the	main	
agreement	 for	 the	Canvas	Goods	Industry	(Witwatersrand	and	Pretoria)	 to	 the	
LFS was unsuccessful and no workers were identified in the LFS as possibly 
belonging	to	the	BC
Chemical	Industry
•	 Separate	agreements	exists	for	the	sub-sectors	
•	 It was difficult to get sufficient occupational information from these agreements 
and it was predominantly operators and assemblers that could be identified in 
the	LFS
•	 In	addition,	labourers	(manufacturing)	were	also	included	in	the	coverage
National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Clothing	Industry
•	 Individual	 provisions	 have	 been	 made	 for	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 country	
(corresponding to the “old” regional bargaining councils), but for the purposes of 
the	analysis,	country-wide	coverage	was	assumed	
•	 It	was	assumed	 that	 the	same	occupations	are	covered	 in	all	 the	 individual	
provisions	
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National	Bargaining	Council	for	the	Diamond	Cutting	Industry
•	 The	Government	Gazette	from	1999	was	used	to	calculated	coverage	in	terms	of	
occupation	groups.	In	the	Government	Gazette	the	industry	activity	was	referred	
to	as	the	cutting	of	gem	diamonds.	Industrial	diamond	cutting	was	therefore	not	
included	in	the	estimate	of	the	coverage.
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry	
•	 The	furniture	manufacturing	industry	was	covered	by	six	regional	councils
•	 In	the	main	agreement	for	the	Eastern	Cape	council,	no	occupation	information	
was	provided,	and	 it	was	decided	to	only	 include	trade	workers	and	operators	
that	are	related	to	furniture	manufacturing.
•	 For	 the	Free	State,	 the		most	recent	 information	was	from	2000,	and	this	was	
used	to	calculate	coverage
•	 There	was	no	occupation	 information	 in	 the	agreement	 for	 the	South	Western	
Districts	–	the	same	occupation	codes	was	used	as	for	the	Eastern	Cape
•	 There was also no occupation information in the Western Cape and the KwaZulu 
Natal	agreements.	Again	the	same	codes	as	for	the	Eastern	Cape	were	used
•	 For	the	Northern	Region,	occupation	 information	from	the	Government	Gazette	
was	used	–	which	was	the	same	as	that	for	the	Free	State
Grain	Cooperative	Industry	Bargaining	Council
•	 The	Award	database	was	the	only	source	for	occupation	information	–	according	
to	this	only	unskilled	workers	are	covered	by	the	agreement,	these	workers	were,	
however,	all	coded	as	informal	sector	employees,	therefore	no	workers	covered	
by	this	council	could	be	estimated	using	the	LFS
Jewellery	and	Precious	Metal	Industry	(Cape)
•	 After	matching	according	to	industry,	occupation	code	and	area,	only	elementary	
workers were identified in the LFS
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National	Bargaining	Council	of	the	Leather	Industry	of	SA
•	 For	 the	 footwear	 section,	 the	 LFS	occupation	 codes	were	matched	 to	 the	
occupations	listed	in	the	gazetted	main	agreement
•	 The	 tanning	section	and	 the	general	goods	and	handbags	section	 fall	under	
the	same	industry	code	in	the	LFS,	therefore	these	two	sections	were	grouped	
together	 and	 the	 job	 descriptions	 from	both	 the	 agreements	were	 used	 to	
estimate	coverage
Metal	and	Engineering	Industries	Bargaining	Council
•	 Main	source	of	occupational	information	was	the	Consolidated	Main	Agreement	
as	well	as	the	Government	Gazette
•	 There	will	be	overestimation	of	coverage	as	 it	 is	 impossible	to	extract	 the	sub-
sectors	not	covered	by	the	agreements	(see	GG	for	subsectors	covered)
•	 In	addition	certain	sub-sectors	were	excluded	by	region	–	it	was	also	impossible	
to	isolate	these	in	the	LFS
•	 The	manufacturing	of	basic	iron	and	steel	was	excluded	–	as	per	the	Government	
Gazette
•	 The	manufacturing	of	agricultural	implements	was	also	excluded	as	it	is	grouped	
together	with	a	range	of	unrelated	activities	in	the	LFS.
New	Tyre	Manufacturing
•	 No	agreement	has	been	published	for	this	bargaining	council
•	 The	Award	database	only	 listed	 labourer	and	machine	operator	as	occupations	
covered
•	 Only machine operator – tyre production was identified in the LFS
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
•	 No	recently	published	information
•	 Only machine operator, refining sugar was included
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National	Textile	Manufacturing	Bargaining	Council
•	 This	bargaining	council	was	registered	 in	January	2004	after	an	amalgamation	
of	 the	SA	Carpet	Manufacturing	 Industry	BC,	SA	Cotton	Textile	Processing	&	
Manufacturing	BC,	SA	Manufactured	Fibres	BC,	National	BC	 for	 the	Textile	
Manufacturing	 Industry	of	 the	RSA,	BC	for	 the	Worsted	Textile	Manufacturing	
Industry,	SA	Wool	&	Mohair	BC
•	 Transitional	 Agreement	 was	 used	 to	 obtain	 industry	 coverage	 and	 the	
Government	Gazette	was	used	for	occupation	information
Building	Industry
•	 Separate	agreements	by	region
•	 Boland:		Government	Gazette	for	occupation	information
•	 Bloemfontein:		No	occupation	information	in	Government	Gazette	–	same	codes	
used	as	for	Boland
•	 Cape	of	Good	Hope:	No	occupation	information	in	Government	Gazette	–	same	
codes	used	as	for	Boland
•	 Kimberly:	Limited	occupation	information	in	Government	Gazette	–	same	codes	
used	as	for	Boland
•	 South/Eastern	Cape;	No	main	agreement	since	2001,	but	still	active	according	
to	Godfrey	et	al.	 (2006).	Voluntary	bargaining	does	take	place	between	certain	
unions	and	employers	with	employers	outside	 these	groups	 implementing	 the	
same	increases.	Same	codes	as	for	above	were	used
Electrical	Industry
•	 Covered	in	both	trade	and	construction	sub-sectors
Motor	Industry	Bargaining	Council	
•	 Occupation	 and	 industry	 coverage	 from	 Government	 Gazette	 and	 from	
agreement	available	on	BC	website
•	 It	should	be	noted	 that	 there	also	exists	a	National	Bargaining	Forum	for	 the	
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automobile	manufacturing	 industry,	which	covers	the	seven	Original	Equipment	
Manufacturers	(Toyota,	VWSA,	General	Motors,	Nissan,	BMW,	Ford	and	Daimler	
Chrysler)	(Godfrey,	2007:56).	Some	of	 the	employees	of	 these	companies	may	
have	been	 included	 in	our	coverage	as	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 identify	 them	in	 the	
LFS.	The	number	of	employees	that	are	listed	under	motor	vehicle	manufacturing	
in	 our	 estimated	 coverage	 is	 only	 about	 13	000	 (about	 five	percent	 of	 the	
bargaining	council’s	total	estimated	coverage).
Restaurant	&	Catering	&	Allied	Trades
•	 Managers	(retail	shop)	are	covered	by	the	agreement	published	in	Government	
Gazette
Tearoom,	Restaurant	&	Catering,	Pretoria
•	 Caterers	are	covered	by	the	agreement	and	 in	 the	LFS,	a	caterer	 is	coded	as	
Manager
Motor	Ferry	Industry
•	 No	occupation	 information	contained	 in	 the	Government	Gazette,	but	some	 in	
the	Award	database
•	 The	motor	ferry	industry	falls	under	the	same	industry	code	as	the	Road	Freight	
Industry	 (see	below)	and	has	 the	same	occupation	codes	–	 to	avoid	double-
counting	it	was	decided	to	only	include	the	Road	Freight	Industry	BC
Road	Freight	Industry	
•	 Includes	workers	in	the	motor	ferry	industry
•	 The	 relevant	 industry	 code	 in	 the	LFS	 includes	a	 range	of	 other	activities,	
meaning that the coverage of the BC is significantly overestimated.
SA	Road	Passenger	BC
•	 Very	 little	 information	available	–	only	bus	drivers	 included	 in	 the	estimated	
coverage
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Transnet
•	 No	extension	published	in	a	Government	Gazette	as	it	only	covers	one	company,	
namely	Transnet
•	 Assumed	that	all	non-managers	in	the	public	enterprises	in	the	relevant	transport	
sectors	are	covered	by	the	agreement
•	 Transnet	is	made	up	of	several	business	units	–	for	some	of	these	units	no	public	
enterprise	workers	were	coded	in	the	LFS	under	the	applicable	 industry	codes	
(eg	Petronet,	Transworks,	Propnet)
•	 So	there	may	be	underestimation
Contract	Cleaning	(Natal)
•	 No	occupation	 information	 in	 the	Government	Gazette	–	only	cleaners	were	
included	in	the	estimated	coverage
Entertainment	industry
•	 Agreements	have	only	been	published	for	 theatrical	productions,	video	industry	
&	duplication	industry,	and	the	distribution	and	duplication	industry
•	 Some	managers	and	professionals	are	included	here
Hairdressing	and	Cosmetology	
•	 Four BCs in this industry (Semi-national, Pretoria, Cape Peninsula, KwaZulu-
Natal)
•	 No	Government	Gazette	could	be	 found	 for	 the	Cape	Peninsula	BC,	but	 the	
same	occupation	codes	were	used	to	estimate	coverage	for	all	four	councils
Laundry,	Cleaning	&	Dyeing
•	 Two bargaining councils (Cape & KwaZulu Natal) with slightly different 
occupations	covered
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Public	Sector	Bargaining	Councils
•	 For	the	Local	Government	Bargaining	Council	all	non-managers	(as	stated	in	the	
Government	Gazette)	was	assumed	to	be	covered	by	the	BC
•	 For	National	and	Provincial	Government	all	non-managers	were	assumed	 to	
be	covered,	as	 it	 is	 impossible	to	separate	the	senior	management	 from	those	
managers	covered	by	the	BC	agreement
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 Appendix E:  Estimated Industrial Council Coverage in the 
       1995 OHS
Industrial	Council/Industry Number Percent
IC	for	the	Cinematography	&	Theatre	Industry 9,801 0.12
IC	for	the	Diamond	Cutting	Industry 762 0.01
IC	for	the	Iron,	Steel,	Engineering	&	Metallurgical	Industry 293,998 3.62
IC	for	the	Leather	Industry 11,039 0.14
IC	for	the	Motor	Industry 195,148 2.40
Textile	Industry 79,355 0.98
Building	Industry 176,839 2.18
Clothing	&	Knitting	Industry 104,217 1.28
Electrical	Contracting	Industry 61,865 0.76
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry 19,229 0.24
Hairdressing	Trade 10,211 0.13
Laundry,	Cleaning	&	Dyeing	Industry 3,236 0.04
Liquor,	Catering	&	Accommodation	Trades 78,063 0.96
IC	for	the	Motor	Transport	Undertaking 70,025 0.86
Canvas	Goods	&	Ropemaking	Industry 10,542 0.13
IC	for	the	Grain	Cooperative	Trade 27,094 0.33
IC	for	the	Contract	Cleaning	Industry 1,192 0.01
IC	for	the	Commercial	and	Distributive	Trade 1,065 0.01
IC	for	Jewellery	and	Precious	Metal 1,557 0.02
IC	for	the	Meat	Trade	(Wholesale	&	Retail	–	East	London) 1,375 0.02
IC	for	the	New	Tyre	Manufacturing	Industry 384 0
Passenger	Transport	Trade 6,162 0.08
Retail	Meat	Trade 2,698 0.03
Tearoom,	Restaurants,	Catering	Trade 23,919 0.29
IC	for	the	Chemical	Industry 3,819 0.05
Total Formal Employment 8,120,279 100
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment 15%
Workers not covered by ICs 6,926,682 85.3
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 Appendix F:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage in 
    the 2005 LFS
Bargaining	Council/Industry Number Percent
Fishing	Industry	BC 91 0
Clothing	Industry 102,132 1.27
Diamond	Cutting	Industry	of	SA	BC 963 0.01
Furniture	Manufacturing	Industry 41,143 0.50
Jewellery	&	Precious	Metal	Industry	(Cape)	BC 1,435 0.02
BC	for	the	Leather	Industry	of	SA 12,295 0.15
Metal	&	Engineering	Industries	BC 196,825 2.45
BC	for	the	New	Tyre	Manufacturing	Industry 6,225 0.08
National BC for the Sugar Manufacturing & Refining Industry 2,430 0.03
BC	for	the	Textile	Manufacturing	Industry	of	SA 35,919 0.45
Building	Industry 73,412 0.91
National	BC	for	the	Electrical	Industry 32,428 0.4
Commercial	Distributive	Trade	BC	(Kimberley) 5,084 0.06
BC	for	the	Meat	Trade,	Gauteng 24,177 0.3
BC	for	the	Motor	Industry 234,809 2.92
BC	for	the	Restaurant,	Catering	&	Allied	Trades 48,274 0.6
BC	for	the	Tearoom,	Restaurant	&	Catering	Trade,	Pretoria 17,212 0.21
Road	Freight	&	Motor	Ferry	Industries 89,662 1.12
SA	Road	Passenger	BC 21,486 0.27
Transnet	BC 49,530 0.62
BC	for	the	Contract	Cleaning	Industry	(Natal) 16,502 0.21
BC	for	the	Entertainment	Industry	of	SA 4,636 0.06
Hairdressing	&	Cosmetology	Industries 18,099 0.23
BC	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	&	Dyeing	Industry	(Cape) 1,825 0.02
BC for the Laundry, Cleaning & Dyeing Industry (KZN) 1,469 0.02
BC	for	the	Chemical	Industry	-	Glass 5,605 0.07
BC	for	the	Chemical	Industry	–	Individual	Consumer	Goods,	
etc.
26,954 0.34
BC	for	the	Chemical	Industry	–Petroleum 1,776 0.02
SA	Local	Government	Bargaining	Council 336,737 4.19
Public	Service	Bargaining	Councils 1,171,195 14.57
Total Formal Employment 8,039,401 100
Total BC Coverage 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Formal Employment) 32%
Total BC Coverage – Government (% of Formal 
Employment)
13%
Workers not covered by BCs 5,459,070 67.9
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 Appendix G:  Broad Labour Force Participation Equation, 1995  
     and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured -0.0246 * 0.1100 -0.0067 0.0894
Asian -0.1458 * 0.0335 -0.1590 * 0.0282
White -0.1702 * 0.1395 -0.1958 * 0.1038
Female -0.2283 * 0.5289 -0.1004 * 0.5187
25-34	years 0.1153 * 0.3232 0.3521 * 0.2687
35-44	years 0.1036 * 0.2459 0.3103 * 0.1772
45-55	years 0.0285 * 0.1471 0.2475 * 0.1326
55-65	years -0.2248 * 0.1030 0.0706 * 0.1005
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET
0.0106 * 6.2797 0.0054 * 6.8834
Complete	GET 0.0157 * 1.2661 0.0138 * 1.5510
Matric 0.0751 * 0.2752 0.1710 * 0.3078
Diploma 0.0852 * 0.0844 0.0378 0.0801
Degree 0.0089 0.0542 -0.0202 0.0646
Urban/Metro 0.0339 * 0.5891 0.0209 * 0.3755
Western	Cape -0.0246 * 0.1230 -0.0295 0.1057
Eastern	Cape -0.0950 * 0.1326 -0.0908 * 0.1346
Northern	Cape -0.0744 * 0.0240 -0.0546 * 0.0191
Free	State 0.0133 0.0685 -0.0708 * 0.0645
KwaZulu Natal -0.0920 * 0.2007 -0.0844 * 0.2046
North	West -0.0607 * 0.0871 -0.0469 * 0.0810
Limpopo -0.0421 * 0.0647 -0.0943 * 0.1068
Mpumalanga -0.1370 * 0.0866 -0.0258 ** 0.0662
No	of	children	under	7	
years	in	hh
-0.0051 * 0.8549 0.0092 * 0.8020
No	of	children	aged	8-15	
yrs	in	hh
-0.0043 ** 0.7973 -0.0320 * 0.8759
No	of	adults	over	60	years	
in	hh
-0.0743 * 0.3044 -0.0688 * 0.2650
Observed	probability 0.7233 0.6766
Predicted	probability	(at	
x-bar)
0.7606 0.7276
Number	of	Observations 60223 67916
Chi2 8318.43	* 7853.16	*
Pseudo	R2 0.1764 0.2353
Source:	 OHS	1995;	LFS	2005:	2	(StatisticsSA);	Own	calculations
Notes: * Significant at one percent level
 ** Significant at five percent level
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Appendix H:  Formal Employment Equation, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured 0.1837 * 0.1131 0.2207 * 0.0948
Asian 0.2032 * 0.0310 0.2575 * 0.0279
White 0.2324 * 0.1403 0.2671 * 0.1074
Female -0.0549 * 0.4465 -0.1516 * 0.4888
25-34	years 0.0509 * 0.3648 -0.0355 0.3570
35-44	years 0.1465 * 0.2696 0.0388 0.2263
45-55	years 0.1907 * 0.1421 0.1166 * 0.1496
55-65	years 0.3433 * 0.0531 0.2469 * 0.0639
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET
-0.0089 * 6.6017 0.0039 7.0179
Complete	GET 0.0076 1.4162 0.0145 * 1.7300
Matric 0.0333 * 0.3188 0.0600 * 0.3830
Diploma 0.1449 * 0.1030 0.2217 * 0.1034
Degree -0.0744 * 0.0669 -0.0112 0.0821
Urban/Metro -0.0260 * 0.6295 0.0268 * 0.4135
Western	Cape 0.0065 0.1295 0.0531 * 0.1135
Eastern	Cape -0.0848 * 0.1196 -0.0715 * 0.1191
Northern	Cape -0.0561 * 0.0229 -0.0062 0.0191
Free	State -0.0491 * 0.0751 0.0578 * 0.0638
KwaZulu Natal 0.0086 0.1869 -0.0004 0.1922
North	West -0.0095 0.0868 -0.0176 0.0814
Limpopo -0.0313 * 0.0648 -0.0181 0.0660
Mpumalanga -0.0177 0.0734 -0.0732 * 0.0934
lambda		 -0.6635 * 0.3776 -0.3782 * 0.3999
Observed	
Probability
0.5947 0.3995
Predicted	
Probability(at	
x-bar
0.6078 0.3797
Number	of	
Observations
42166 43631
Chi2 5140.6		* 3398.3		*
Pseudo	R2 0.143 0.167
Source:	 OHS	1995;	LFS	2005:	2	(StatisticsSA);	Own	calculations
Notes: * Significant at one percent level
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Appendix I:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 1995
90th-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.0550 0.0512 ** 0.0038
Asian 0.0595 0.1099 * -0.0505
White 0.0461 0.0266 0.0195
Female -0.0565 -0.0194 -0.0371
No	education	to	
Incomplete	GET		(None	to	
Grade	8)
-0.0114 -0.0024 -0.0091 **
Complete	GET	(Grade	9	
to	11)
0.0104 0.0065 0.0038
Matric	(Grade	12) -0.0381 0.0012 -0.0394 **
Diploma 0.0518 -0.0387 0.0904 **
Degree 0.0986 * 0.0726 * 0.0260
Urban -0.0898 * -0.0474 * -0.0424 **
Western	Cape 0.0966 * 0.0307 0.0659
Eastern	Cape 0.2226 * 0.0942 * 0.1285 *
Northern	Cape 0.0640 0.0746 -0.0106
Free	State 0.2231 * 0.0958 * 0.1274 *
KwaZulu Natal 0.0885 * 0.0494 0.0391
North	West 0.2045 * 0.0741 * 0.1304 *
Limpopo 0.2323 * 0.1528 * 0.0794 **
Mpumalanga 0.1282 ** 0.0611 ** 0.0672* **
Managers 0.1466 ** 0.0446 0.1020
Professionals -0.0022 -0.0060 0.0038
Clerks -0.0353 -0.0398 0.0045
Service	Workers 0.1638 * 0.0882 * 0.0756* **
Skilled	Agricultural 0.4731 * 0.0784 0.3947 **
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.1440 * 0.0769 * 0.0671 **
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.0181 0.0037 0.0143
Agriculture -0.0124 0.0865 -0.0989 *
Mining -0.1190 ** -0.0774 ** -0.0416
Utilities -0.1115 -0.1481 ** 0.0366
Construction -0.0075 0.0383 -0.0458
Wholesale	and	Retail	
Trade
-0.0519 0.0011 -0.0530
Transport -0.1901 * -0.0640 -0.1261 *
Finance	 -0.0732 -0.0017 -0.0715
Commercial,	Social	and	
Personal	Services
-0.1692 * -0.0766 * -0.0926 *
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Private	Households 0.2069 0.2434 ** -0.0366
Experience 0.0031 0.0051 ** -0.0020
Experience	squared 4.22E-06 -6.7E-05 7.07E-05
Log	of	hours	worked	per	
month
-0.1987 * -0.03 -0.1687 *
Bargaining	council/union	
member
-0.0788 ** -0.0512 -0.0276
Bargaining	council/non-
union	member
0.0052 0.0078 -0.0026
Union -0.2294 * -0.0737 * -0.1558 *
Employment	lambda 0.2462 ** 0.1430 0.1032
Constant 2.3470 * 0.6576 * 1.6894 *
Number	of	Observations 24479 24479 24479
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.3976 0.3976 0.4512
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.4286 0.4512 0.4286
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
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Appendix J:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 2005
90-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.066 -0.008 0.074
Asian 0.043 -0.042 0.085
White 0.257** 0.035 0.223*
Female -0.036 0.000 -0.035
No	education	to	Incomplete	GET		(None	to	
Grade	8)
0.006 0.003 0.004
Complete	GET	(Grade	9	to	11) 0.054** 0.027* 0.027
Matric	(Grade	12) 0.183* 0.104* 0.080
Diploma -0.093 -0.093 0.000
Degree 0.060 0.050** 0.010
Metro -0.026 -0.041 0.015
Western	Cape -0.140** -0.074** -0.067
Eastern	Cape -0.113** -0.024 -0.090
Northern	Cape 0.004 -0.007 0.012
Free	State 0.087 -0.006 0.094
KwaZulu Natal 0.058 -0.021 0.079
North	West -0.040 -0.011 -0.029
Limpopo 0.100** 0.032 0.068
Mpumalanga -0.012 -0.003 -0.010
Managers 0.335* 0.162** 0.172*
Professionals -0.023 -0.049 0.026
Clerks 0.076 -0.033 0.110*
Service	Workers 0.189* 0.044 0.145*
Skilled	Agricultural 0.299** 0.229** 0.070
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.102 0.038 0.065
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.022 0.008 0.014
Agriculture -0.412* -0.247* -0.165*
Mining -0.177* -0.203* 0.026
Utilities 0.277 0.046 0.232
Construction -0.103* -0.042 -0.061**
Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade -0.163* -0.104* -0.059
Transport 0.117 0.000 0.117
Finance	 -0.134** -0.077 -0.058
CSPS -0.040 -0.098* 0.058
Private	Households -0.506* -0.410* -0.096
Experience 0.015* 0.006 0.009
Experience	squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log	of	hours	worked	per	month -0.102** 0.036 -0.137*
Private	Sector	BC	Member -0.058 -0.078* 0.020
Public	Sector	BC	Member -0.045 -0.095* 0.050
Union -0.247* -0.112* -0.135*
Emp_lambda 0.188 -0.030 0.218**
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Constant 1.494 0.496* 0.998*
No	of	Observations 14746 14746 14746
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.402 0.402 0.4122
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.238 0.4122 0.238
Source:	 LFS	2005(2)	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
